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EMPLOYER	  LOSSES	  AND	  DEFERRED	  COMPENSATION	  
	  





	   Most	   large	   public	   companies	   offer	   their	   executives	   the	   opportunity	   to	  
defer	   the	   receipt	   and	   taxation	   of	   a	   portion	   of	   their	   salary	   or	   other	   current	  
compensation	   until	   retirement	   or	   some	   other	   future	   date,	   and	   equity	  
compensation,	   which	   also	   entails	   deferral	   of	   pay	   and	   taxation,	   constitutes	   a	  
large	  fraction	  of	  the	  typical	  executive	  pay	  package.	  	  Conventional	  wisdom	  holds	  
that	   employer	   net	   operating	   losses	   (NOLs)	   improve	   the	   joint	   economics	   of	  
deferred	   and	   equity	   compensation	   (henceforth	   together	   “deferred	  
compensation”)	   for	   the	   parties.	   	   However,	   empirical	   studies	   provide	   little	  
evidence	  of	  an	  association	  between	  employer	  NOLs	  and	  deferred	  compensation	  
use.	   	   This	   paper	   focuses	   on	   two	   potential	   explanations	   for	   this	   apparent	  
disconnect.	   	   First,	   this	   paper	   shows	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	   employer	  
NOLs	  and	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  deferred	  compensation	  is	  more	  complex	  and	  less	  
predictable	   than	   is	  generally	   recognized,	   that	  a	   larger	  NOL	  position	  does	  not	  
necessarily	   produce	   a	   larger	   driving	   force	   for	   use	   of	   deferred	   compensation,	  
and	   that	   in	   some	  cases	   employer	  NOLs	   can	  actually	   result	   in	  poorer	  deferred	  
compensation	   economics.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   some	   employers	   and	   executives	   may	  
rationally	   choose	   to	   ignore	   employer	   NOLs	   when	   making	   compensation	  
decisions.	  	  Second,	  even	  if	  companies	  are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  employer	  
NOLs	   when	   making	   compensation	   decisions,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   research	  
methods	   currently	   in	   use	   would	   detect	   the	   sensitivity.	   	   The	   commonly	   used	  
proxies	  and	  simulations	  of	  employer	  effective	  marginal	  tax	  rates	  that	  have	  been	  
employed	   in	   these	   studies	  may	   not	   adequately	   capture	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	  
relationship	  between	  NOLs	  and	  the	  economics	  of	  deferred	  compensation.	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   Companies	   and	   their	   employees	  may,	   to	   a	   large	  degree,	   choose	  whether	   to	  
structure	  pay	  as	  cash	  or	  other	  currently	  includable	  and	  deductible	  compensation	  or	  
as	   deferred	   compensation,	   including	   equity-­‐based	   pay,	   which	   will	   be	   included	   in	  
income	   and	   deducted	   in	   the	   future.	   	   	   It	   is	   well	   understood	   that	   taxes	   affect	   the	  
attractiveness	  of	  deferred	  compensation	  relative	  to	  current	  compensation	  and	  that	  
deferred	   compensation	   is	   relatively	  more	   attractive	  when	   employee	   tax	   rates	   are	  
expected	  to	  be	  lower	  in	  the	  future	  than	  today,	  when	  employer	  tax	  rates	  are	  expected	  
to	  be	  higher	  in	  the	  future,	  and	  when	  an	  employer	  can	  earn	  a	  greater	  after-­‐tax	  rate	  of	  
return	  on	  any	  compensation	  that	  is	  deferred.1	  	  	  
	  
	   	  In	  recent	  years,	  well	  over	  half	  of	  U.S.	  public	  companies	  have	  reported	  having	  
a	   net	   operating	   loss	   (NOL)	   carryforward,2	  reflecting	   deductions	   (including	   prior	  
year	  NOLs)	   in	   excess	  of	   gross	   income.	   	   If	   significant,	   these	  NOLs	   reduce	  employer	  
effective	   marginal	   tax	   rates	   (MTRs)	   and	   could	   make	   deferred	   compensation	  
relatively	   more	   attractive	   by	   improving	   employer	   after-­‐tax	   returns	   on	   deferred	  
amounts	  and/or	  by	   reducing	   the	  value	  of	   current	  employer	  deductions	   relative	   to	  
future	  employer	  deductions.3	  	  	  	  
	  
	   However,	  empirical	  studies	  that	  utilize	  variations	  in	  employer	  NOL	  positions	  
in	  search	  of	  evidence	  that	  taxation	  affects	  the	  choice	  between	  current	  and	  deferred	  
compensation	  have	  met	  with	  only	  limited	  success.4	  	  As	  Professor	  John	  Graham	  puts	  
it,	  “[o]verall,	   there	  is	  only	  modest	  evidence	  that	  taxes	  are	  a	  driving	  factor	  affecting	  
corporate	  or	  employee	  compensation	  decisions.”5	  	  Moreover,	   in	  a	   recent	   survey	  of	  
corporate	   tax	   executives	   conducted	   by	   Graham	   and	   a	   group	   of	   co-­‐authors,	   only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Myron	  S.	  Scholes	  &	  Mark	  A.	  Wolfson,	  Taxes	  and	  Employee	  Compensation	  Planning,	  
TAXES	   (Dec.	   1986);	  MYRON	  S.	  SCHOLES	  ET	  AL,	   TAXES	  AND	  BUSINESS	  STRATEGY:	  A	  PLANNING	  
APPROACH	  183	  (2d	  ed.	  2002).	  
2	  Shane	  Heitzman	  &	  Rebecca	  Lester,	  Net	  Operating	  Loss	  Carryforwards	  and	  Corporate	  
Financial	  Policies	  57	  (working	  paper,	  May	  25,	  2018)	  (reporting	  that	  between	  2011	  
and	  2016	  over	  50%	  of	  Compustat	  companies	  had	  an	  NOL	  according	   to	  Compustat	  
coding	  but	  that	  hand-­‐collected	  financial	  statement	  data	  indicated	  that	  85%	  to	  90%	  
of	  companies	  had	  NOLs).	  
3	  SCHOLES	  ET	  AL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  184	  (“Because	  deferred	  compensation	   is	   favored	   if	  
the	   employer’s	   tax	   rate	   is	   expected	   to	   increase	   in	   the	   future,	   deferral	   may	   be	  
especially	  appropriate	  when	  a	  firm	  in	  an	  NOL	  position	  cannot	  effectively	  use	  current	  
tax	  deductions.”);	  see	  also	  Scholes	  &	  Wolfson,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  825.	  
The	   effective	  marginal	   tax	   rate	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   present	   value	   of	   additional	   taxes	  
paid	  on	  an	  additional	  dollar	  of	  income	  earned	  today.	   	  SCHOLES	  ET	  AL,	  supra	  note	  1.	   	  I	  
follow	   the	  accounting	  and	   finance	   literature	   in	  denoting	   the	  effective	  marginal	   tax	  
rate	  as	  “MTR.”	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10.6%	  of	  respondents	  reported	  that	  marginal	  tax	  rates	  were	  the	  primary	  tax	  rates	  
used	  in	  making	  compensation	  decisions,	  while	  44.8%	  of	  respondents	  reported	  that	  
their	  primary	  rates	  were	  statutory	  tax	  rates,	  which	  presumably	  would	  not	  take	  into	  
account	  the	  impact	  of	  NOLs.6	  
	  
	   These	  studies	  raise	  several	  questions.	   	  Are	  firms	  failing	  to	  consider	  joint	  tax	  
minimization	  in	  the	  design	  of	  compensation	  programs?	  	  If	  so,	  is	  that	  failure	  a	  result	  
of	   ignorance	   or	   laziness,	   or	   might	   it	   be	   rational?	   	   Alternatively,	   are	   researchers	  
failing	   to	   detect	   tax	   sensitivity	   in	   compensation	   arrangements	   due	   to	   poor	  
experimental	  design	  or	  the	  use	  of	  poor	  instruments?	  	  	  
	  
This	  article	  does	  not	  aim	   to	   fully	   resolve	   these	  questions.	   	   Its	  more	  modest	  
goal	   is	   to	   advance	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   challenges	   that	   companies	   and	  
researchers	  face	   in	   incorporating	  employer	  NOL	  positions	   into	  their	  compensation	  
design	   analyses.	   	   The	   article’s	   novel	   strategy	   is	   to	   bifurcate	   and	   unpack	   the	   two	  
distinct	   ways	   in	   which	   NOLs	   may	   affect	   employer	   taxes	   and	   improve	   (generally)	  
deferred	   compensation	   economics.	   	   First,	  NOLs	  may	   increase	   an	   employer’s	   after-­‐
tax	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  deferred	  sums	  (the	  rate	  of	  return	  effect).	   	  Second,	  NOLs	  often	  
increase	  the	  value	  of	  employer	  deductions	  at	  deferred	  compensation	  payout	  relative	  
to	   grant	   (deduction	   deferral	   effect).	   	   I	   show	   that	   these	   two	   effects	   may	   work	   in	  
tandem	  to	  boost	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  deferred	  compensation	  when	  an	  employer	  has	  
a	   large	   NOL	   position,	   but	   that	   they	   may	   not.	   	   In	   some	   cases,	   employers	   deploy	  
deferred	   funds	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   after-­‐tax	   rates	   of	   return	   are	   less	   affected	   or	  
unaffected	   by	   NOLs.	   	   I	   also	   show	   that	   while	   NOLs	   at	   grant	   tend	   to	   improve	   the	  
economics	  of	  deferred	  compensation,	   this	   is	  not	  necessarily	   the	   case.	   	   In	  addition,	  
even	  when	  grant	  date	  NOLs	  do	  improve	  the	  economics	  of	  deferred	  compensation,	  a	  
larger	  NOL	  position	  at	  grant	  does	  not	  necessarily	  produce	  a	  larger	  driving	  force	  for	  
deferral.	  	  In	  mathematical	  terms,	  the	  relationship	  is	  not	  always	  monotonic.	  	  	  
	  
In	   short,	   while	   conventional	   wisdom	   holds	   that	   employer	   NOLs	   boost	   the	  
economic	  attractiveness	  of	  deferred	  compensation,	  this	  article	  both	  complicates	  and	  
clarifies	  this	  picture.	  	  
	  
My	  analysis	  leads	  to	  two	  main	  conclusions.	  	  First,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  irrational	  for	  
firms	  to	   ignore	  grant	  date	  NOLs	  in	  making	  some	  deferred	  compensation	  decisions.	  	  
Given	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   NOLs	   and	   the	   economics	   of	  
deferred	  compensation	  as	  well	  as	  unpredictable	  payoffs,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  surprising	  
to	   find	   managers	   making	   decisions	   based	   on	   simple	   heuristics,	   such	   as	   statutory	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  John	  R.	  Graham	  et	  al,	  Tax	  Rates	  and	  Corporate	  Decision-­‐Making,	  30	  REV.	  FIN.	  STUDIES	  
3128,	   3141	   (2017).	   	   Of	   respondents	   listing	   statutory	   tax	   rates	   (STRs)	   as	   their	  
primary	   tax	   rates	   for	   compensation	  decisions,	   57%	  selected	  U.S.	   STRs,	  while	  43%	  
selected	  jurisdiction	  specific	  STRs.	  	  Id.	  
4	  
	  
rates,	   rather	   than	   upon	   full-­‐blown	   expected	   values	   incorporating	   the	   impact	   of	  
NOLs.7	  
	  
	   Second,	   even	   if	   firms	   are	   sensitive	   to	   taxation	   in	   making	   compensation	  
decisions,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  research	  methods	  that	  have	  been	  deployed	  to	  test	  
this	   sensitivity	   would	   detect	   it.	   	   Researchers	   often	   use	   NOL	   dummy	   variables,	  
sometimes	  combined	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  profits,	  as	  proxies	  for	  low	  MTRs.8	  	  These	  may	  (or	  
may	  not)	  be	  good	  proxies	  for	  grant	  date	  MTR,	  but	  they	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  effective	  as	  
proxies	   for	   the	   tax	   advantage	   of	   deferred	   compensation,	   which	   is	   not	   always	  
monotonically	  related	  to	  grant	  date	  MTR.	   	  More	  sophisticated	  research	  techniques	  
employ	   simulations	   of	   MTR,	   both	   at	   grant	   and	   payout,	   which,	   in	   theory,	   is	   an	  
improvement.	   	   However,	   different	   simulations	   produce	   dramatically	   different	  
estimated	  MTRs	   for	   the	   same	   firms	   in	   the	   same	  years.9	  	  Moreover,	   a	   recent	  paper	  
suggests	  that	  the	  input	  data	  used	  in	  some	  of	  these	  simulations	  is	  more	  error-­‐riddled	  
than	  previously	  suspected.10	  	   It	  appears	  that	  we	  are	  a	   long	  way	  from	  being	  able	  to	  
confidently	  test	  the	  relationship	  between	  employer	  tax	  rates	  and	  the	  use	  of	  deferred	  
compensation.	  	  
	  
	   The	   remainder	   of	   this	   article	   is	   organized	   as	   follows.	   	   Part	   II	   provides	  
background	  on	  the	  use	  and	  basic	  economics	  of	  deferred	  compensation.	  	  Part	  III,	  the	  
heart	  of	   the	  article,	  unpacks	  the	  relationship	  between	  NOLs,	  effective	  marginal	   tax	  
rates,	   and	   the	   economics	   of	   both	   pure	   deferral	   and	   counterparty	   deferral,	   e.g.,	  
deferred	  compensation	  arrangements.	  	  This	  Part	  bifurcates	  the	  impact	  of	  NOLs	  into	  
non-­‐mutually	   exclusive	  deduction	  deferral	   and	   rate	   of	   return	   effects,	   as	   described	  
above,	  and	  considers	   the	   implications	   for	  equity	  and	  other	  deferred	  compensation	  
arrangements.	   	  The	  primary	  takeaway	  is	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  employer	  losses	  on	  the	  
tax	   advantage	  of	  deferred	   compensation	   is	  more	   complicated	  and	   less	  predictable	  
than	  is	  generally	  understood.	   	  This	  Part	  also	  presents	  two	  alternative	  explanations	  
for	  the	  relatively	  modest	  use	  of	  deferred	  compensation	  by	  companies	  with	  losses	  –	  
payment	   risk	   and	   an	   excessive	   focus	   on	   GAAP	   earnings	   relative	   to	   after-­‐tax	   cash	  
flows.	   	   Part	   IV	   explores	   empirical	   research	   on	   the	   effect	   of	   taxes	   on	   deferred	  
compensation	  and	  suggests	  that	  commonly	  used	  proxies	  for	  company	  marginal	  tax	  
rates	  may	   not	   adequately	   capture	   the	   impact	   of	   losses	   on	   deferred	   compensation	  
economics.	   	   Part	   V	   briefly	   considers	   the	   impact	   of	   statutory	   rate	   changes	   on	   the	  
economics	  and	  use	  of	  deferred	  compensation.	  	  Part	  VI	  concludes.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  I	  assume	  that	  willingness	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  complexity	  of	  NOLs	  with	  respect	  to	  
compensation	  decisions	  will	  turn	  in	  part	  on	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  potential	  gains.	  Cf	  
Graham	  et	   al,	   supra	   note	   6,	   at	   3130	   (suggesting	   that	   reliance	   on	   STRs	   over	  MTRs	  
may	   reflect	   “efficient”	   use	   of	   heuristics	   when	   the	   differences	   between	   MTRs	   and	  
STRs	  are	  relatively	  small).	  
8	  See	  infra	  Part	  IV.	  
9	  See	  infra	  Part	  IV.	  
10	  Heitzman	  &	  Lester,	  supra	  note	  2	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II.	  Background	  on	  the	  Use	  and	  Economics	  of	  Deferred	  Compensation	  
	  
A.	  The	  Deferred	  Compensation	  Picture	  
	  
	   Deferred	   compensation	   is	   compensation	   relating	   to	   current	   services	   that	   is	  
payable,	  and	  taxable,	  in	  a	  future	  year	  or	  years.	  	  Deferred	  compensation	  may	  serve	  as	  
an	   explicit	   or	   implicit	   substitute	   for	   current	   compensation,	   but	   in	   all	   cases	   the	  
employer	   presumably	   has	   more	   funds	   available	   to	   use	   or	   invest,	   or	   less	   need	   to	  
borrow,	  between	  the	  point	  of	  deferral	  and	  the	  point	  of	  future	  payout	  than	  it	  would	  
have	   had	   if	   compensation	   had	   been	   paid	   currently.	   	   A	   considerable	   fraction	   of	  
executive	   and	   rank	  and	   file	   compensation	  paid	  by	  U.S.	   corporations	   is	  deferred	   in	  
this	  sense.	  	  	  
	  
Let’s	   begin	   at	   the	   top.	   	   A	   recent	   survey	   by	   the	   Hay	   Group	   found	   that	   the	  
average	   compensation	   package	   of	   the	   CEOs	   of	   300	   large	   companies	   consisted	   of	  
14%	  salary,	  22%	  bonus/annual	   incentive,	  16%	  options,	  16%	  restricted	  stock,	   and	  
32%	  performance	  awards.11	  	  The	  options,	  restricted	  stock,	  and	  performance	  awards	  
are	   all	   equity-­‐based	   deferred	   compensation.	   	   Gains	   on	   options	   are	   included	   in	  
income	   and	   deductible	   by	   the	   employer	   when	   the	   options	   are	   exercised	   and	   the	  
underlying	  shares	  can	  be	  sold,12	  typically	  five	  or	  six	  years	  following	  grant,	  equating	  
to	   five	  or	  six	  years	  of	  deferral.13	  	  Absent	  an	  IRC	  §83(b)	  election,	  restricted	  stock	   is	  
included	  in	  income	  and	  deducted	  when	  the	  stock	  vests	  and	  becomes	  transferrable,	  
typically	   within	   five	   years	   of	   grant. 14 	  	   Performance	   award	   plans	   are	   quite	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  HAY	  GROUP,	  EXECUTIVE	  COMPENSATION	  2013:	  DATA,	  TRENDS	  AND	  STRATEGIES.	  
12	  Treas.	  Reg.	  §1.83-­‐7(a)	  (options	  lacking	  a	  readily	  ascertainable	  fair	  market	  value	  at	  
the	  time	  of	  grant	  taxable	  at	  exercise);	  IRC	  §83(h)	  (deduction	  allowed	  for	  the	  taxable	  
year	  in	  which	  service	  provider	  included	  option	  value	  in	  income).	  	  This	  tax	  treatment	  
applies	   to	   non-­‐qualified	   options,	   which	   make	   up	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   options,	  
particularly	  for	  senior	  executives.	  	  Incentive	  stock	  options	  are	  taxed	  differently.	  	  See	  
infra	  note	  90.	  	  Unless	  otherwise	  indicated,	  I	  will	  assume	  throughout	  this	  article	  that	  
options	  are	  non-­‐qualified.	  
13	  Although	   options	   typically	   can	   be	   exercised	   as	   late	   as	   10	   years	   following	   grant,	  
exercise	   of	   non-­‐qualified	   options	   within	   a	   year	   or	   two	   of	   vesting	   is	   much	   more	  
common.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  J.	  Carr	  Bettis	  et	  al.,	  Exercise	  Behavior,	  Valuation,	  and	  the	  Incentive	  
Effects	  of	  Employee	  Stock	  Options,	   76	   J.	   FIN.	   ECON.	   445,	   446	   (2005)	   (finding	   for	   a	  
sample	   of	   140,000	   option	   exercises	   by	   executives	   at	   almost	   4000	   firms	   between	  
1996	   and	   2002	   that,	   on	   average,	   options	   were	   exercised	   a	   little	   over	   two	   years	  
following	   vesting	   and	   more	   than	   four	   years	   prior	   to	   expiration);	   Jennifer	   N.	  
Carpenter,	   The	   Exercise	   and	   Valuation	   of	   Executive	   Stock	   Options,	   48	   J.	   FIN	   ECON.	  
127,	   138-­‐39	   (1998)	   (finding	   for	   a	   sample	   of	   forty	   firms	   (mainly	   large	  
manufacturers)	  that	  executive	  stock	  options	  granted	  between	  1983	  and	  1984	  were,	  
on	  average,	  exercised	  after	  5.8	  years).	  
14	  IRC	  §83(a).	  	  If	  a	  §83(b)	  election	  is	  made,	  restricted	  stock	  is	  included	  in	  income	  at	  
fair	  market	  value	  at	  grant	  and	  the	  stock	  is	  then	  held	  as	  a	  capital	  asset.	  	  The	  tax	  paid	  
6	  
	  
heterogeneous,	   but	   most	   plans	   provide	   for	   payouts,	   in	   shares	   or	   cash,	   based	   on	  
company	   performance	   over	   a	   three-­‐year	   period,	   and	   taxation	   occurs	   at	   payout,	  
providing	  for	  three	  years	  of	  deferral.15	  	  In	  sum,	  the	  deferral	  associated	  with	  equity-­‐
based	  pay	  typically	  ranges	  from	  about	  three	  to	  about	  six	  years.	  
	  
	   Salary	  and	  annual	  bonus,	  making	  up	  in	  aggregate	  about	  one-­‐third	  of	  average	  
CEO	  pay,	  are	  taxable	  in	  the	  year	  earned	  unless	  the	  executive	  participates	  in	  a	  non-­‐
qualified	  deferred	  compensation	  (NQDC)	  program	  that	  allows	  her	   to	  defer	  all	  or	  a	  
portion	  of	   these	  amounts,	  plus	  any	  earnings	  on	  these	  amounts,	  until	  a	   future	  date,	  
often	  until	  retirement.	  	  Assuming	  all	  rules	  are	  met,	  NQDC	  amounts	  are	  included	  and	  
deducted	   at	   payout,	   providing	   for	   deferral	   over	   various,	   fact-­‐specific	   periods.16	  	  
Typically,	   however,	   deferral	   periods	   associated	  with	   NQDC	   are	   longer	   than	   those	  
associated	  with	  equity-­‐based	  pay.	  
	  
	   To	   complete	   the	   picture,	   CEOs	   and	   other	   senior	   executives	   may	   also	  
participate	   in	   tax	  qualified	  deferred	  compensation	  arrangements,	   such	  as	  401(k)s,	  
that	  allow	  them	  to	  set	  aside	  and	  invest	  some	  current	  compensation	  on	  explicitly	  tax-­‐
preferred	  terms.17	  	  However,	  the	  dollar	  caps	  on	  these	  plans	  are	  so	  low	  as	  to	  render	  
them	  essentially	  irrelevant	  for	  senior	  executives.18	  	  	  
	  
	   The	   compensation	  menu	   is	   similar	   for	   lower	   level	   executives	   and	   rank	  and	  
file	  employees,	  although	  as	  one	  moves	  down	  the	  ranks,	  salary	  and	  annual	  bonuses	  
tend	   to	   gain	   in	   importance	   and	   equity-­‐based	   pay	   to	   decline.	   	   The	   opportunity	   to	  
participate	  in	  NQDC	  programs	  typically	  kicks	  in	  at	  the	  senior	  vice	  president	  level	  or	  
once	  compensation	  reaches	  six	  figures.19	  	  Given	  smaller	  pay	  packages	  at	  these	  levels,	  
tax	  qualified	  savings	  plans	  become	  relatively	  more	  important.	  
	  
	   This	  article	  will	  not	  address	  tax	  qualified	  savings	  plans.	  	  Given	  the	  explicit	  tax	  
subsidies,	   these	   are	   low	   hanging	   fruit.	   	   Companies	   that	   can	   afford	   to	   incur	   the	  
administrative	  costs	  should	  find	  it	  in	  their	  interest	  to	  make	  these	  plans	  available.	  	  I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cannot	  be	  recovered	  if	  the	  stock	  fails	  to	  vest,	  and	  §83(b)	  elections	  by	  employees	  of	  
companies	   with	   publicly	   traded	   stock	   are	   rare.	   	   See	   David	   I.	   Walker,	   Is	   Equity	  
Compensation	  Tax	  Advantaged?,	  84	  B.U.	  L.	  REV.	  695,	  707	  (citing	  interview	  evidence).	  
15	  Compensation	   consultant	   FW	   Cook	   reported	   in	   2017	   that	   90%	   of	   performance	  
awards	  granted	  to	  executives	  at	  the	  250	  largest	  S&P	  500	  companies	  vested	  in	  three	  
years.	  	  FW	  COOK,	  THE	  2017	  TOP	  250	  REPORT	  (Aug.	  2017).	  
16	  See	  David	   I.	  Walker,	  The	  Practice	  and	  Tax	  Consequences	  of	  Nonqualified	  Deferred	  
Compensation	  75	  WASH.	  &	  LEE	  L.	  REV.	  2065,	  2080-­‐82	  (2018)	  (discussing	  the	  potential	  
application	  of	  the	  common	  law	  constructive	  receipt,	  cash	  equivalence,	  and	  economic	  
benefit	  doctrines,	  as	  well	  as	  IRC	  §409A,	  to	  deferred	  compensation	  arrangements	  and	  
the	  requirements	  for	  achieving	  deferral	  of	  taxation).	  
17	  Id.	  at	  2075-­‐77.	  
18	  Id.	  




will	   use	   the	   term	   “deferred	   compensation”	   in	   this	   article	   to	   refer	   to	   both	   equity-­‐
based	  pay	  and	  NQDC,	  but	  not	  to	  qualified	  plans.	  
	  
B.	  The	  Basic	  Economics	  of	  Deferred	  Compensation	  
	  
	   Although	   frequently	   overlooked	   or	   neglected,20	  the	   economics	   of	   deferred	  
compensation	  are	  well	  understood.	  	  As	  Professors	  Myron	  Scholes	  and	  Mark	  Wolfson	  
demonstrated,	   deferred	   compensation	   is	   jointly	   preferred	   by	   employers	   and	  
employees	  over	  current	  compensation	  if	  and	  only	  if:	  
	  
(1)	   	   !!!!!" !!!!"
!
!!  !!!! !!!!! !




where	  tEE	  is	  the	  employee’s	  marginal	  tax	  rate	  in	  the	  year	  of	  grant	  (0)	  or	  at	  deferred	  
compensation	  payout	   (d),	   tER	   represents	   the	  employer’s	  MTRs,	   and	  rER	   and	  rEE	  are	  
the	  after-­‐tax	  rates	  of	  return	  available	  to	  the	  employer	  and	  the	  employee.21	  	  All	  else	  
equal,	  deferred	  compensation	  is	  tax	  preferred	  over	  current	  compensation	  when	  the	  
employee	  faces	  a	  lower	  tax	  rate	  at	  payout,	  when	  the	  employer	  faces	  a	  higher	  tax	  rate	  
at	  payout,	  and/or	  when	  the	  employer	  can	  earn	  a	  greater	  after-­‐tax	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  
deferred	  amounts	  than	  the	  employee	  could	  earn	  on	  her	  own.22	  
	  
Scholes	   and	   Wolfson	   derived	   this	   equation	   in	   the	   context	   of	   NQDC	  
arrangements,	  but	  although	   it	   is	  slightly	   less	  obvious,	   the	  same	  analysis	  applies	   to	  
equity	  compensation.	   	  An	  employee	  who	  receives	  unvested	  stock	  or	  options	  or	  the	  
promise	  of	  future	  payouts	  in	  cash	  or	  equity	  based	  on	  her	  company’s	  stock	  price	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Daniel	   I.	  Halperin	  &	  Alvin	  C.	  Warren,	   Jr.,	  Understanding	  Income	  Tax	  Deferral,	   67	  
TAX	   L.	   REV.	   317	   (2014)	   (providing	   examples	   of	   errors	   in	   deferred	   compensation	  
analysis).	  
21	  Scholes	  and	  Wolfson,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  826;	  SCHOLES	  ET	  AL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  183.	  	  This	  
equation	  is	  derived	  by	  holding	  the	  employer	  indifferent	  between	  cash	  and	  deferred	  
compensation	   and	   determining	   the	   outcomes	   for	   the	   employee.	   	   In	   brief,	   $1	   of	  
current	   salary	  would	  be	   taxed	   to	   the	  employee	  at	   the	  employee’s	   current	   tax	   rate	  
and	   the	   after-­‐tax	   amount	   could	   be	   invested	   at	   the	   employee’s	   after-­‐tax	   rate	   of	  
return,	  providing	  an	  after-­‐tax	  amount	  after	  d	  years	  of:	   $1	   *	   (1	   -­‐	  𝑡!!!)	   *   1+ 𝑟!! ! .	  	  
The	  employer	  would	  be	   indifferent	  between	  paying	  $1	  currently	  and	  setting	  aside	  
$1	   less	   the	   tax	  benefit	  of	  a	  current	  deduction.	   	  That	  amount	  would	   increase	  at	   the	  
employer’s	  after	  tax	  rate	  of	  return.	  	  Because	  the	  employer	  would	  deduct	  the	  amount	  
paid	  to	   the	  employee	  at	   time	  d,	   the	  employer	  would	  be	   indifferent	   if	   it	  grossed	  up	  
the	  payment	  by	  the	  employer’s	  tax	  rate	  at	  time	  d.	   	  The	  employee	  would	  pay	  tax	  at	  
her	   time	   d	   tax	   rate,	   leaving	   her	  with	   an	   after-­‐tax	   amount	   at	   time	   d	   of:	   $1	   *	  [ 1−
  𝑡!"! ∗ 1+ 𝑟!" ! 	  /	   1− 𝑡!"# ]	  *	   1− 𝑡!!" .    Setting	   the	   two	   equations	   equal	   and	  
rearranging	   terms	   provides	   the	   indifference	   point	   described	   in	   equation	   1.	   	   An	  
equivalent	   result	   would	   be	   had	   by	   holding	   the	   employee	   indifferent	   and	  
determining	  employer	  outcomes.	  
22	  Scholes	  and	  Wolfson,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  826;	  SCHOLES	  ET	  AL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  183.	  	  	  
8	  
	  
deferred	   both	   the	   enjoyment	   and	   the	   taxation	   of	   her	   compensation,	   and	   her	  
employer	  has	  additional	   funds	   that	   it	  may	   invest	  between	   the	  grant	  of	   the	  equity-­‐
based	  compensation	  and	  payout.	  	  The	  economics	  are	  the	  same.23	  
	  
	   As	   Professors	   Halperin	   and	   Warren	   explain,	   the	   deferral	   associated	   with	  
deferred	   compensation,	   one	   of	   a	   class	   of	   arrangements	   to	   which	   they	   refer	   as	  
“counterparty	  deferral,”	  is	  different	  in	  kind	  than	  the	  “pure	  deferral”	  associated	  with,	  
say,	  expensing	  an	  amount	  that	  ordinarily	  would	  be	  capitalized.24	  	  Expensing	  results	  
in	   the	   deferral	   of	   income	   inclusion	   relative	   to	   economic	   accrual. 25 	  	   Deferred	  
compensation	   defers	   recognition	   for	   one	   party	   (here,	   the	   investment	   return	   on	  
deferred	  amounts	  ultimately	  enjoyed	  by	  an	  employee)	  by	  shifting	   the	   income	   to	  a	  
second	   party	   (the	   employer)	   in	   the	   interim.26	  	   As	   they	   show,	   if	   employers	   and	  
employees	   face	   consistent	  MTRs	   at	   the	   points	   of	   deferral	   and	   payout,	   any	   benefit	  
from	   deferred	   compensation	   “is	   due	   entirely	   to	   the	   difference	   between	   the	  
employer’s	  and	  employee’s	  after-­‐tax	   rate	  of	   return	  on	   income	  earned	  by	   investing	  
the	  deferred	  amount.”27	  
	  
III.	  NOLS,	  MTRs,	  and	  the	  Advantage	  of	  Deferral	  
	  
	   MTRs	   change	   over	   time	  with	   changes	   in	   statutory	   rates	   and	   other	   factors.	  	  
Some	  research	  on	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  compensation	  design	  to	  tax	  has	  exploited	  such	  
“longitudinal”	   variations	   in	   rates.28	  	   The	   variation	   in	  MTRs	   among	   companies	   at	   a	  
given	  time,	  which	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  cross-­‐sectional	  variation,	  is	  largely	  a	  function	  of	  
NOLs.29	  	  This	   is	  particularly	   true	   in	   the	  U.S.	   today	  given	   the	  elimination	  under	   the	  
Tax	   Cuts	   and	   Jobs	   Act	   (TCJA)	   of	   graduation	   in	   the	   corporate	   income	   tax	   rate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  See	   Walker,	   supra	   note	   14.	   	   Equivalence	   depends	   on	   an	   assumption	   that	   the	  
employee	  would	  be	  able	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  same	  securities,	  employer	  stock	  or	  options	  
on	   employee	   stock	   or	   essentially	   equivalent	   securities,	   outside	   of	   the	   company’s	  
equity	   compensation	   plan.	   	   This	   may	   not	   be	   true	   for	   employees	   of	   non-­‐public	  
companies.	  
24	  See	  Halperin	  &	  Warren,	  supra	  note	  20.	  
25	  Id.	  at	  317.	  
26	  Id.	  at	  324.	  
27	  Id.	  at	  328.	   	  This	  result	  follows	  directly	  from	  equation	  1.	   	  If	   	  𝑡!!! = 𝑡!!" 	  and	  𝑡!"!=	  
𝑡!"# ,	   then	   equation	   1	   reduces	   to	   1+ 𝑟!" !/ 	   1+ 𝑟!! ! 	  >	   1	   and	   deferred	  
compensation	  is	  preferred	  when	  an	  employer’s	  after-­‐tax	  rate	  of	  return	  exceeds	  that	  
of	  an	  employee.	  	  Halperin	  and	  Warren	  suggest	  that	  “shifting”	  might	  be	  a	  better	  term	  
for	  counterparty	  deferral	  arrangements	  such	  as	  deferred	  compensation,	  but	  for	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  term	  “deferral”	  has	  been	  used	  so	  extensively	  in	  the	  literature.	  
28	  See	  infra	  Part	  V	  for	  a	  brief	  discussion.	  
29	  Certainly	   there	  are	  other	   factors,	  particularly	   for	  multi-­‐national	   companies.	   	  See	  
infra	  Part	  III.D.1.	  
9	  
	  
schedule.30	  	  Most	  research	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  taxation	  and	  compensation	  
has	   attempted	   to	   exploit	   cross-­‐sectional	   variation.	   	   This	   article	   addresses	   that	  
literature,	  and	  this	  Part	  considers	  the	  relationship	  between	  employer	  NOLs,	  MTRs,	  
and	  the	  tax	  advantage	  of	  deferred	  compensation.	  	  In	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  particular	  
characteristics	  of	  deferred	  compensation,	  and	  counterparty	  deferral	  more	  generally,	  
I	   begin	   by	   analyzing	   the	   relationship	   between	  NOLs,	  MTRs,	   and	   the	   economics	   of	  
pure	  deferral.	  	  	  
	  
A.	  NOL	  Duration	  &	  MTRs	  	  	  
	  
	   Suppose	   a	   company	   is	   in	   a	   loss	  position	   (i.e.,	   has	  NOLs)	   and	   is	   considering	  
entering	   into	   a	   transaction	  yielding	  either	  pure	  or	   counterparty	  deferral.	   	  We	  will	  
assume	  for	  now	  that	  the	  company	  operates	   in	  a	  single	   jurisdiction.	   	  That	  company	  
may	  be	  in	  an	  NOL	  position	  for	  a	  single	  year,	  for	  several	  years,	  or	  many	  years	  before	  
its	  NOLs	  are	  consumed,	  if	  they	  ever	  are.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  company	  may	  move	  back	  and	  
forth	  between	  NOL	  years	  and	  years	  without	  NOLs,	  but	   for	  simplicity	   I	  will	  assume	  
for	   now	   some	   number	   of	   years	   in	   an	   NOL	   position	   followed	   by	   consistent	  
profitability,	   which	   is	   the	   pattern	   typically	   associated	   with	   start-­‐up	   companies.31	  	  
The	  presence	  of	  NOLs	  reduces	  the	  company’s	  MTR	  for	  the	  year	  in	  which	  the	  decision	  
is	  to	  be	  made.	  	  	  
	  
Consider	   a	   company	   with	   a	   single	   year	   NOL.	   	   Incremental	   deductions	   or	  
income	   items	   (that	   are	   insufficient	   to	   fully	   offset	   the	  NOL)	  have	  no	   impact	   on	   the	  
company’s	   tax	  bill	   for	   that	  year,	  but	   that	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   the	   company	   faces	  a	  
zero	  MTR.	  	  The	  company’s	  MTR	  depends	  on	  the	  duration	  of	  its	  NOLs.	  	  If	  the	  company	  
has	  an	  NOL	  for	  a	  single	  year	  (year	  1)	  and	  pays	  tax	  at	  the	  statutory	  rate	  (STR)	  in	  the	  
following	  year	   (year	  2),	   incremental	  deductions	  or	   income	   incurred	   in	   year	  1	  will	  
affect	  the	  company’s	  tax	  bill	  in	  year	  2.	  	  The	  year	  1	  impact	  in	  present	  value	  terms	  is	  
simply	   the	   amount	   of	   the	   income	   or	   deduction,	   multiplied	   by	   the	   STR	   in	   year	   2,	  
discounted	  back	   to	  year	  1.32	  	   Suppose,	   for	   example,	   that	   a	   company	   incurs	   a	   $100	  
deduction	   in	  year	  1	   in	  which	   it	  has	  an	  NOL.	   	  That	  deduction	   increases	   the	  NOL	  by	  
$100.	  	  In	  year	  2	  the	  company	  pays	  tax	  after	  deducting	  accumulated	  NOLs	  at	  the	  STR	  
of,	  say	  30%.	  	  The	  year	  1	  deduction	  reduces	  the	  company’s	  tax	  bill	  by	  $30	  in	  year	  2.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  The	   legislation	   colloquially	   known	   as	   the	   Tax	   Cuts	   and	   Jobs	   Act	   (TCJA)	   was	  
enacted	  as	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  115-­‐97,	  131	  Stat.	  2054	  (2017).	  	  See	  TCJA	  §13001	  (applying	  a	  
uniform	  tax	  rate	  of	  21%	  to	  corporate	  taxable	  income).	  
31	  See	  Victor	  Fleischer,	  The	  Rational	  Exuberance	  of	  Structuring	  Venture	  Capital	  Start-­‐
ups,	  57	  TAX	  L.	  REV.	  137,	  145-­‐46	  (2003)	  (explaining	  various	  features	  of	  the	  tax	  code	  
that	  tend	  to	  result	  in	  start-­‐up	  firms	  generating	  large	  tax	  losses	  in	  their	  early	  years);	  
Gregg	   Polsky,	   Explaining	   Choice-­‐of-­‐Entity	   Decisions	   by	   Silicon	   Valley	   Start-­‐Ups,	   70	  
HASTINGS	  L.J.	  409,	  418	  (2019)	  (explaining	  that	  Silicon	  Valley	  start-­‐ups	  (unlike	  main	  
street	  small	  businesses)	  are	  generally	  expected	  to	  generate	  large	  tax	  losses	  in	  their	  
early	  years	  and	  to	  experience	  a	  relatively	  long	  period	  before	  reaching	  profitability).	  
32	  See	  Scholes	  &	  Wolfson,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  830.	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Discounting	  this	  reduction	  back	  to	  year	  1	  at	  7%	  yields	  a	  year	  1	  present	  value	  of	  $30	  
x	  .9346	  =	  $28.04.33	  	  	  
	  
Given	  that	  MTR	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  present	  value	  of	  additional	  taxes	  paid/saved	  
on	   an	   additional	   dollar	   of	   income/deduction	   today,	   this	   equates	   to	   an	   MTR	   of	  
$28.04/$100	  =	  28.04%	  (at	  a	  7%	  after-­‐tax	  discount	  rate).	   	  More	  generally,	  the	  MTR	  
arising	  from	  an	  NOL	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  statutory	  rate	  in	  the	  year	  in	  which	  the	  income	  or	  
deduction	   item	   first	   affects	   cash	   taxes	  discounted	  by	   the	  appropriate	   interest	   rate	  
factor.	   	   The	   longer	   the	  NOL	   duration,	   the	   greater	   the	   discount,	   and	   the	   lower	   the	  
year	  1	  MTR.34	  
	  
	   Prior	   to	   the	   passage	   of	   the	   TCJA,	   U.S.	   federal	   tax	   NOLs	   could	   be	   carried	  
forward	  for	  no	  more	  that	  20	  years.35	  	  After	  that	  point,	  an	  unused	  NOL	  would	  expire.	  	  
Effectively,	   the	   discount	   rate	   for	   NOLs	  with	   duration	   in	   excess	   of	   20	   years	   fell	   to	  
zero.	  	  Under	  the	  TCJA	  there	  is	  no	  limit	  on	  the	  number	  of	  years	  that	  an	  NOL	  may	  be	  
carried	  forward.36	  	  If	  a	  company	  manages	  to	  remain	  in	  business	  while	  incurring	  25	  
or	   30	   years	   of	   losses,	   those	   NOLs	   would	   be	   available	   in	   future	   years	   if	   the	   firm	  
turned	  the	  corner.	  	  	  
	  
One	  caveat.	   	  The	  MTRs	  faced	  by	  a	  company	  are	  not	  simply	  a	  factor	  of	  NOLs.	  	  
STRs	   may	   change	   between	   the	   year	   of	   deferral	   and	   the	   year	   of	   reckoning.	   	   For	  
simplicity,	  however,	  I	  will	  assume	  that	  STRs	  are	  consistent	  over	  time	  and	  that	  MTRs	  
are	  only	  affected	  by	  NOLs.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  For	  simplicity,	   I	  have	  adopted	  default	  assumptions	  of	  a	  30%	  statutory	  employer	  
tax	  rate,	  a	  10%	  pre-­‐tax	   interest	   rate,	  and	  a	  7%	  after-­‐tax	   interest/discount	   rate.	   	  A	  
7%	  after-­‐tax	  discount	  rate	  is	  consistent	  with	  these	  other	  assumptions	  in	  the	  absence	  
of	  NOLs	  and	   in	   cases	  of	   relatively	   short	  NOL	  duration.	   	  As	  Professor	   John	  Graham	  
notes,	  however,	   the	  relationship	  between	  after-­‐tax	  discount	  rates	  and	  MTRs	  in	  the	  
presence	  of	  NOLs	  is	  circular.	  	  John	  R.	  Graham,	  Debt	  and	  the	  Marginal	  Tax	  Rate,	  41	  J.	  
FIN.	  ECON.	   41,	   47	   (1996).	   	   The	   appropriate	   after-­‐tax	   discount	   rate	   for	   greater	  NOL	  
duration	  cases	  would	  be	  somewhat	  greater	  than	  7%	  under	  these	  other	  assumptions.	  	  
In	  some	  cases,	  results	  will	  also	  be	  reported	  under	  more	  conservative	  assumptions	  of	  
a	  20%	  STR	  and	  5%	  pre-­‐tax	  interest	  rate.	  
34	  Formally,	  MTR	  =	  ($1	  *	  STRn)/(1	  +	  r)n,	  where	  r	  is	  the	  after-­‐tax	  discount	  rate	  and	  n	  
the	  NOL	  duration.	  	  SCHOLES	  ET	  AL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  158.	  	  The	  after-­‐tax	  interest	  rate	  r	  is	  
equal	  to	  the	  pre-­‐tax	  rate	  (i)	  multiplied	  by	  (1-­‐STR).	  
35	  IRC	  §172(b)(2017).	  	  The	  20-­‐year	  carryforward	  limit	  was	  adopted	  in	  1997.	  	  Prior	  
to	  1997,	  NOLs	  could	  be	  carried	   forward	  no	  more	   than	  5	  years.	   	  See	  Lewis	  T.	  Barr,	  
BNA	  TAX	  MANAGEMENT	  PORTFOLIOS:	  NET	  OPERATING	  LOSSES	  AND	  OTHER	  TAX	  ATTRIBUTES	  –	  
SECTION	  381,	  382,	  383,	  384	  AND	  269	  (780-­‐4th).	  
36	  IRC	  §172(b)(2018).	   	  However,	  under	   the	  TCJA,	  NOLs	  may	  only	  be	  used	   to	  offset	  
80%	  of	  taxable	  income,	  which	  will	  tend	  to	  extend	  NOL	  durations.	  	  IRC	  §172(a).	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B.	  Impact	  of	  NOL	  Duration	  on	  the	  Advantage	  of	  Pure	  Deferral	  
	  
	   Consider	   the	   paradigm	   case	   of	   an	   opportunity	   to	   expense	   an	   amount	   that	  
ordinarily	  would	  be	   capitalized.	   	   Suppose	   that	  a	  $100	  deduction	  would	  have	  been	  
allowed	   in	   ten	   years	   had	   the	   item	  been	   capitalized.	   	   At	   an	   STR	   of	   30%	   and	   a	   7%	  
after-­‐tax	   discount	   rate,	   the	   present	   value	   of	   that	   deduction	  would	   be	   $15.25.37	  	   If	  
there	   are	   no	   NOLs	   and	   the	   party’s	   MTR	   equals	   the	   STR,	   expensing	   increases	   the	  
present	   value	   of	   the	   deduction	   to	   $30,	   a	   $14.75	   improvement,	   or	   14.75%	   of	   the	  
amount	  deducted.	  	  More	  generally,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  NOLs,	  expensing	  increases	  the	  
present	  value	  of	  the	  deduction	  by	  
	  
(2)	   	   ($X	  *	  STR)	  –	  ($X	  *	  STR	  *	  DF),	  
	  
where	   DF	   is	   the	   appropriate	   after-­‐tax	   discount	   factor	   for	   the	   period	   preceding	  
deduction	  following	  capitalization.38	  	  	  
	  
Now	   suppose	   that	   the	   taxpayer	   faces	   an	   NOL	   in	   year	   1,	   but	   consumes	   all	  
NOLS	  and	  returns	  to	  net	  profitability	  in	  year	  2.	  The	  taxpayer	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  take	  
advantage	   of	   expensing	   until	   the	   second	   year,	   reducing	   the	   present	   value	   of	   the	  
expensing	  opportunity	  and	  the	  overall	  benefit	  of	  expensing	  or	  deferral,	  which	  now	  
becomes	  
	  
(3)	   	   ($X	  *	  STR	  *	  DF1)	  –	  ($X	  *	  STR	  *	  DF10),	  
	  
where	  DF1	  is	  the	  discount	  factor	  for	  a	  single	  year	  and	  DF10	  is	  the	  discount	  factor	  for	  
the	  10	  year	  period	  prior	  to	  deduction	  following	  capitalization.39	  	  At	  an	  STR	  of	  30%	  
and	   a	   7%	   after-­‐tax	   discount	   rate,	   the	   single	   year	   NOL	  would	   reduce	   the	   value	   of	  
deferral	   from	   14.75%	   of	   the	   amount	   expensed	   to	   12.79%.40 	  	   The	   benefit	   of	  
expensing	   continues	   to	   decline	   as	   NOL	   duration	   approaches	   the	   length	   of	   the	  
deferral	  period.	  	  If	  NOL	  duration	  equals	  or	  exceeds	  the	  period	  of	  deferral,	  expensing	  
no	   longer	   provides	   any	   economic	   benefit.	   	   To	   see	   this,	   suppose	   that	   a	   start-­‐up	  
company	  was	  in	  an	  NOL	  position	  for	  12	  years	  and	  began	  paying	  tax	  in	  year	  13.	  	  That	  
taxpayer	   would	   receive	   the	   benefit	   in	   the	   same	   year	   (year	   13)	   of	   an	   amount	  
expensed	  in	  year	  1	  or	  deducted	  following	  capitalization	  in	  year	  10.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  The	  discount	  factor	  is	  .5083.	  
38	  See	   Theodore	   S.	   Sims,	   Income	   Taxation	   and	   Asset	   Valuation	   (II),	   The	   Value	   of	  
Preferential	   Taxation,	   71	   TAX	   L.	   REV.	   53,	   80	   (2017)	   (presenting	   an	   equivalent	  
equation	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  deferral).	   	  The	  discount	  factor,	  of	  course,	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  
reciprocal	  of	  (1+i(1-­‐STR))d,	  where	  i	   is	  the	  pre-­‐tax	  interest	  rate	  and	  d	  the	  period	  of	  
deferral.	  	  I	  will	  use	  the	  DF	  notation	  to	  simplify	  the	  exposition.	  
39	  See	  id.	  at	  80,	  note	  76	  (presenting	  a	  more	  general	  version	  of	  this	  equation).	  
40	  A	  one-­‐year	  NOL	  reduces	  the	  present	  value	  of	  expensing	  to	  30%	  x	  .9346	  =	  28.04%,	  
which	  is	  12.79	  percentage	  points	  better	  than	  capitalization.	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   Several	  points	  are	  worth	  noting	  here.	  	  First,	  as	  exemplified	  in	  Figure	  1	  below,	  
a	  single	  year	  NOL	  has	  a	  relatively	  modest	  impact	  on	  the	  benefit	  of	  expensing;	  but	  the	  
benefit	  of	  expensing	  is	  quickly	  eroded	  with	  a	  more	  extended	  NOL	  duration.	  	  Second,	  
while	  one	  might	  generally	  assume	  that	  expensing	  is	  valuable	  in	  any	  case	  in	  which	  a	  
taxpayer	  faces	  a	  positive	  MTR,	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  if	  a	  taxpayer’s	  MTR	  is	  
reduced	  as	  a	  result	  of	  NOLs.	  	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  a	  taxpayer	  that	  expects	  to	  be	  in	  
an	  NOL	  position	  for	  10	  years.	  	  Assuming	  a	  30%	  STR	  and	  7%	  after-­‐tax	  discount	  rate,	  
the	   taxpayer’s	   MTR	   at	   the	   point	   of	   expensing	   would	   be	   about	   15%.	   	   But	   an	  
opportunity	   to	   expense	   an	   amount	   that	   otherwise	   would	   be	   capitalized	   and	  
deducted	  ten	  or	  fewer	  years	  hence	  would	  provide	  no	  benefit	  to	  that	  taxpayer	  as	  its	  
deduction	   would	   occur	   at	   the	   same	   point	   (year	   11)	   under	   either	   scenario.	   	   By	  
contrast,	   a	   taxpayer	   facing	   a	   consistent	   15%	   statutory	   rate	   and	   no	   NOLs	   would	  
benefit	   from	  expensing	  an	   item	   that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  deducted	  at	   any	  point	   in	  
the	   future.41	  	   In	  other	  words,	  when	   it	  comes	   to	   the	  relationship	  between	  MTR	  and	  





C.	  Impact	  of	  NOL	  Duration	  on	  Deferred	  Compensation	  	  
	  
	   The	   impact	  of	  NOLs	  on	   the	   joint	   economics	  of	  deferred	   compensation	   (and	  
other	  examples	  of	  counterparty	  deferral)	  is	  more	  complex.	  	  Consider	  a	  typical	  NQDC	  
arrangement	   in	   which	   an	   employee	   elects	   to	   defer	   a	   portion	   of	   her	   current	  
compensation	  in	  exchange	  for	  her	  employer’s	  promise	  to	  deliver	  that	  compensation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  The	  benefit	  of	  expensing	  at	  a	  15%	  STR	  would	  be	  exactly	  50%	  of	  the	  benefit	  at	  a	  
30%	  STR.	  
42	  Assumptions:	  30%	  STR;	  10%	  pre-­‐tax	  interest	  rate;	  7%	  after-­‐tax	  discount	  rate.	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in	  the	  future	  plus	  some	  agreed	  return.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  cash	  compensation,	  of	  course,	  
the	   employee	   would	   be	   taxed	   at	   the	   time	   of	   receipt	   and	   the	   employer	   would	   be	  
entitled	  to	  an	  equivalent	  deduction.	  	  If	  all	  NQDC	  requirements	  are	  met,	  however,	  the	  
employee	  in	  our	  hypothetical	  will	  be	  taxed	  on	  her	  entire	  receipt	  at	  payout	  and	  her	  
employer	  would	  be	  entitled	   to	  an	  equivalent	  deduction	  at	   that	   time.43	  	   In	  between	  
deferral	  and	  payout	  the	  employer	  holds	  extra	  funds	  and	  invests	  them	  as	  it	  sees	  fit	  –	  
in	   the	   business,	   in	   securities	   that	   form	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   return	   promised	   to	   the	  
employee,	  or	  whatever	  it	  chooses.	  
	  
	   The	   circumstances	   under	   which	   deferred	   compensation	   will	   be	   jointly	   tax	  
advantaged	   relative	   to	   current	   compensation	   are	   described	   in	   Equation	   1	   above.	  	  
Employer	   NOLs	   can	   impact	   the	   economics	   of	   deferred	   compensation	   in	   two	  
separate,	   but	   non-­‐mutually	   exclusive	   ways	   –	   by	   increasing	   the	   after-­‐tax	   rates	   of	  
return	   available	   to	   the	   employer	   and	   by	   reducing	   the	   after-­‐tax	   value	   of	   employer	  
deductions	  at	  the	  point	  of	  deferral	  relative	  to	  payout.	  	  I	  will	  begin	  with	  the	  latter.	  
	  
	   1.	  The	  Deduction	  Deferral	  Effect	  
	  
	   Because	   the	   employer’s	   baseline	   would	   be	   immediately	   deductible	  
compensation	  and	  the	  alternative	  is	  deferred	  compensation	  deductible	  at	  payout,44	  I	  
will	  refer	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  employer	  NOLs	  on	  the	  relative	  value	  of	  this	  deduction	  as	  
the	  deduction	  deferral	  effect.45	  	  As	  before,	   I	  assume	  that	  an	  employer	   is	   in	  an	  NOL	  
position	   at	   the	   time	   of	   deferral	   and	   consider	   the	   impact	   of	   NOL	   duration	   on	   the	  
attractiveness	   of	   deferred	   compensation. 46 	  	   For	   now,	   I	   also	   assume	   that	   the	  
employer’s	  after-­‐tax	  rate	  of	   return	  on	  deferred	  amounts	   is	  not	  affected	  by	  NOLs.47	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  See	  supra	  note	  16.	  
44	  To	   reiterate,	   I	   am	   assuming	   that	   all	   deferred	   compensation	   is	   deductible	   by	  
employers	  at	  payout,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  payout.	   	  Options	  may	  expire	  out	  of	  the	  money,	  in	  
which	  case	   there	   is	  no	  employee	   inclusion	  and	  no	  employer	  deduction.	   	  However,	  
options	   have	   a	   positive	   expected	   payout.	   	   In	   exchange	   for	   and	   in	   the	   event	   of	  
favorable	   employee	   taxation,	   incentive	   stock	   options	   (ISOs)	   do	   not	   provide	   an	  
employer	  deduction	  at	  any	  time.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  my	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  more	  common	  
examples	  of	  deferred	  compensation	  in	  which	  there	  is	  symmetry	  between	  employee	  
and	  employer	  taxation.	  	  I	  exclude	  ISOs	  from	  my	  analysis	  unless	  otherwise	  indicated.	  	  
For	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  ISOs,	  see	  infra	  note	  90.	  
45	  Conceivably,	   a	   recipient	   of	   deferred	   compensation	   could	   be	   in	   an	  NOL	  position,	  
but	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   article	   is	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   employer	   NOLs	   on	   deferred	  
compensation	   economics	   and	   practices.	   	   Moreover,	   I	   would	   think	   it	   unusual	   for	  
executives	   or	   other	   high	   level	   employees,	   whose	   incomes	   consists	   largely	   of	  
compensation	  and	  investment	  returns,	  to	  be	  in	  an	  NOL	  position.	  
46	  Note	  again	  that	  I	  am	  assuming	  some	  number	  of	  years	  in	  an	  NOL	  position	  followed	  
by	  a	  number	  of	  years	  without	  an	  NOL,	  i.e.,	  the	  start-­‐up	  model.	  	  	  
47	  I	  also	  assume	  that	  the	  compensation	  deduction	  (and	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  the	  return	  
on	  deferred	  amounts)	  are	  sufficiently	  small	  relative	  to	  the	  employer’s	  other	  income	  
14	  
	  
This	   assumption	   allows	  me	   to	   isolate	   the	  deduction	  deferral	   effect,	   and	   it	   is	   not	   a	  
wholly	   unrealistic	   assumption	   in	   the	   context	   of	   NQDC/equity	   compensation	  
arrangements	   in	  which	  the	   freed	  up	  funds	  may	  be	   invested	   in	  the	  employer’s	  own	  
stock	  or	  in	  corporate	  owned	  life	  insurance	  (COLI).48	  
	  
	   As	   equation	   1	   indicates,	   all	   else	   equal,	   deferred	   compensation	   is	   more	  
attractive	  relative	  to	  current	  compensation	  when	  the	  employer’s	  MTR	  is	  greater	  at	  
payout	   than	   at	   the	   point	   of	   deferral.	   	   NOLs	   can,	   of	   course,	   affect	   the	   employer’s	  
effective	  tax	  rate	  at	  both	  points.	  	  All	  else	  equal,	  employer	  NOLs	  leading	  to	  a	  reduced	  
MTR	  at	  the	  point	  of	  deferral	  favors	  NQDC/equity	  pay	  because	  the	  deduction	  for	  the	  
alternative	   immediately	   includable	   compensation	   would	   be	   of	   lesser	   value.	   	   The	  
impact	   increases	  monotonically	  with	  NOL	   duration	   until	   infinite	   NOLs	   render	   the	  
employer	  effectively	  tax	  exempt.	  	  The	  longer	  the	  duration	  of	  NOLs	  and	  the	  lower	  the	  
employer’s	  MTR	  at	  the	  point	  of	  deferral,	  and	  the	  greater	  the	  advantage	  of	  deferred	  
compensation,	  all	  else	  equal.	  	  	  
	  
But	  all	  else	  is	  not	  always	  equal,	  because	  a	  reduced	  MTR	  at	  the	  point	  of	  NQDC	  
or	  equity	  payout	  reduces	  the	  employer’s	  tax	  benefit	  from	  that	  payout,	  which	  reduces	  
the	   joint	   value	  of	   counterparty	  deferral.	   	  As	   a	   result,	   and	  as	  described	   in	  Figure	  2	  
below,	   the	   overall	   relationship	   between	  NOL	   duration	   and	   the	   deduction	   deferral	  
benefit	  of	  deferred	  compensation	  is	  not	  monotonic.	  	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  pure	  deferral,	  a	  
single	  year	  NOL	  has	  only	  a	  modest	   (in	   this	   case,	  modestly	  positive)	   impact	  on	   the	  
economics	  of	  deferred	  compensation.	   	  The	  deduction	  deferral	  benefit	  is	  greatest	  in	  
cases	  in	  which	  NOL	  duration	  matches	  the	  period	  of	  deferral.	  	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  MTR	  at	  
the	  point	  of	  deferral	  is	  significantly	  reduced,	  favoring	  deferral,	  but	  MTR	  at	  payout	  is	  
unaffected.	   	   If	  NOL	  duration	  extends	  beyond	  the	  deferral	  period,	  MTR	  at	  payout	   is	  
reduced,	  reducing	  the	  joint	  value	  of	  deferred	  compensation.	  	  Given	  the	  diminishing	  
present	  value	  significance	  of	  cash	  flows	  far	  out	  in	  the	  future,	  the	  marginal	  impact	  of	  
additional	  NOL	   years	   on	   the	   value	   of	   the	   deduction	   at	   payout	   (closer	   in	   time	   and	  
larger)	  more	  than	  offsets	  the	  marginal	   impact	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  deduction	  at	  the	  
point	  of	  deferral	  (further	  in	  time	  and	  smaller),	  and	  the	  combined	  deduction	  deferral	  
benefit	  begins	  trending	  downward	  once	  NOL	  duration	  exceeds	  the	  deferral	  period.	  	  
Ultimately,	   infinite	   NOLs	  would	   result	   in	   a	   zero	  MTR	   at	   the	   point	   of	   deferral	   and	  
payout,	  and	  the	  timing	  of	  employer	  deductions,	   in	   isolation,	  would	  have	  no	  impact	  
on	  the	  economics	  of	  deferred	  compensation.49	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  deductions	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  pay	  current	  or	  deferred	  compensation	  does	  not	  
affect	  whether	  the	  employer	  is	  in	  an	  NOL	  position	  in	  any	  year.	  	  	  
48	  As	   discussed	   infra	   Part	   III.D.1,	   in	   cases	   in	   which	   an	   employer	   invests	   deferred	  
amounts	   in	   its	   own	   stock	   or	   in	   COLI	   products,	   an	   employer	   may	   face	   no	   tax	   on	  
investment	  returns	  irrespective	  of	  any	  NOL	  position.	  
49	  Another	  way	  to	  see	  this	  is	  to	  first	  imagine	  that	  an	  employer	  has	  no	  NOLs,	  such	  that	  
its	  MTR	  at	  grant	  and	  payout	  are	  equal	  to	  the	  STR,	  which	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  consistent.	  	  
In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  right-­‐hand	  side	  of	  equation	  1	  is	  unity	  and	  the	  deduction	  deferral	  
effect	  is	  nonexistent.	  	  Next	  imagine	  that	  the	  employer	  has	  NOLs	  that	  reduce	  MTR	  at	  




As	   portrayed	   in	   Figure	   2	   below,	   the	   potential	   impact	   of	   the	   deduction	  
deferral	   effect	   is,	   unsurprisingly,	   a	   function	   of	   the	   deferral	   period.	   	   It	   is	   also	   a	  
function	  of	  the	  employer’s	  statutory	  rate	  (here	  assumed	  to	  be	  30%)	  and	  the	  pre-­‐tax	  
interest	  rate	  (here	  assumed	  to	  be	  10%).50	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  251	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
increasing	   the	   attractiveness	   of	   deferred	   compensation.	   	   This	   is	   the	   positive	  
deduction	  deferral	  effect	  exemplified	  in	  Figure	  2.	  	  Finally,	  imagine	  an	  employer	  with	  
infinite	  NOLs	  such	  that	  its	  MTR	  at	  grant	  and	  payout	  is	  zero.	  	  The	  right-­‐hand	  side	  of	  
equation	  1	  returns	  to	  unity	  and	  the	  deduction	  deferral	  effect	  disappears.	   	   Ignoring	  
the	  impact	  on	  after	  tax	  rates	  of	  return,	  deferred	  compensation	  is	  equally	  attractive	  
in	  the	  absence	  of	  employer	  NOLs	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  infinite	  NOLs.	  	  	  
50 	  The	   deduction	   deferral	   effect	   is	   quite	   sensitive	   to	   these	   assumptions.	   	   For	  
example,	  assuming	  an	  employer	  STR	  of	  20%,	  a	  pre-­‐tax	  interest	  rate	  of	  5%,	  and	  a	  10-­‐
year	  deferral	  period,	  a	  10-­‐year	  NOL	  duration	  would	  result	  in	  an	  8.1%	  improvement	  
in	   deferred	   compensation	   economics	   arising	   from	   this	   channel,	   versus	   the	   21%	  
improvement	  associated	  with	  my	  default	  assumptions.	  
51	  This	  graph	  reflects	   the	   improvement	   in	  deferred	  compensation	  economics	  given	  
various	  NOL	  durations.	  	  Other	  assumptions	  are:	  30%	  STR;	  10%	  pre-­‐tax	  interest	  rate;	  
7%	   after-­‐tax	   discount	   rate.	   	   As	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   Appendix	   and	   following	   the	  
methodology	  of	  Scholes	  &	  Wolfson,	  supra	  note	  1,	  and	  SCHOLES	  ET	  AL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  the	  
improvement	  in	  joint	  economics	  associated	  with	  the	  deduction	  deferral	  effect	  is	  [(1	  -­‐	  
STR	   *	   DFC)/(1	   –	   STR	   *	   DFD)]	   –	   1;	   where,	   for	   any	   given	   NOL	   duration,	   DFC	   is	   the	  
discount	   factor	   for	   the	   number	   of	   years	   until	   a	   current	   deduction	   would	   first	   be	  
useful	   and	   DFD	   is	   the	   discount	   factor	   for	   the	   number	   of	   years	   until	   a	   deferred	  




	   2.	  The	  Rate	  of	  Return	  Effect	  
	  
	   The	   second	  way	   that	   employer	   NOLs	   can	   affect	   the	   economics	   of	   deferred	  
compensation	  is	  by	  increasing	  the	  after-­‐tax	  rates	  of	  return	  available	  to	  the	  employer	  
on	   the	   deferred	   funds	   during	   the	   period	   of	   deferral.	   	   Recall	   that	   deferred	  
compensation	  is	  more	  advantageous	  when	  an	  employer	  can	  earn	  a	  greater	  after-­‐tax	  
rate	   of	   return	   on	   deferred	   sums	   than	   an	   employee	   could	   earn	   on	   her	   own.	   	   And	  
employer	  NOLs	  increase	  an	  employer’s	  after-­‐tax	  rates	  of	  return.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  NOLs	  
on	  after-­‐tax	  rates	  of	  return	  will	  be	  greatest	  when,	  absent	  NOLs,	  returns	  are	  taxed	  at	  
the	  statutory	  rate.	  	  This	  will	  not	  always	  be	  the	  case,	  and	  exceptions	  are	  discussed	  in	  
Section	  D	   below,	   but	   the	   examples	   provided	   in	   Figure	   3	   below	   assume	   a	   baseline	  
STR	  of	  30%	  on	   investment	  returns,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  pre-­‐tax	  rate	  of	  return	  of	  10%.	   	  As	  
demonstrated,	  the	  improvement	  in	  deferred	  compensation	  economics	  arising	  from	  
the	  rate	  of	  return	  effect	  increases	  monotonically	  with	  NOL	  duration.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  
just	   a	   year	  or	   two	  of	  NOLs	   is	  quite	   small,	   even	   trivial,	   but	   a	   longer	  period	  of	  NOL	  
years	   can	   result	   in	   a	   substantial	   increase	   in	   joint	   tax	   advantage,	   particularly	   for	  
longer	  periods	  of	  deferral.	   	  An	   infinite	   stream	  of	  NOLs	  would	   render	  an	  employer	  
effectively	  tax	  exempt	  with	  respect	  to	  investment	  returns	  on	  deferred	  funds.52	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 	  Under	   my	   default	   assumptions,	   an	   infinite	   stream	   of	   NOLs	   would	   result	   in	  
improvement	   in	   counterparty	   deferral	   economics	   of	   31.9%	   for	   10-­‐year	   deferral,	  
14.8%	   for	  5-­‐year	  deferral,	   and	  8.6%	   for	  3-­‐year	  deferral.	   	   For	  10-­‐year	  deferral,	   for	  
example,	   under	   my	   assumptions,	   deferred	   funds	   would	   grow	   by	   1.0710	   in	   the	  






	   	   	  
3.	  Combined	  NOL	  Effects	  
	  
	   In	   cases	   in	  which	   both	   the	   deduction	   deferral	   effect	   and	   the	   rate	   of	   return	  
effect	   apply,	   the	   effects	   combine	   to	   increase	   the	   attractiveness	   of	   deferred	  
compensation.	  	  This	  would	  be	  the	  case,	  for	  example,	  for	  an	  NQDC	  plan	  sponsor	  that	  
invested	   deferred	   funds	   in	   taxable	   bonds.	   	   The	   overall	   improvement	   in	   deferred	  
compensation	   economics	   reaches	   a	   peak	   at	   the	   point	   at	   which	   NOL	   duration	  
matches	  the	  period	  of	  deferral	  and	  continues	  steadily	  thereafter.	  	  An	  example	  of	  the	  
separate	   and	   combined	   effects,	   based	   on	   10	   years	   of	   deferral,	   a	   30%	   statutory	  
employer	  tax	  rate,	  and	  a	  10%	  pre-­‐tax	  interest	  rate	  is	  presented	  in	  Figure	  4	  below.54	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Assumptions:	   30%	   STR;	   10%	   pre-­‐tax	   interest	   rate;	   7%	   after-­‐tax	   interest	   rate.	  	  
Calculation	  details	   are	   provided	   in	   the	  Appendix.	   	   As	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   deduction	  
deferral	  effect,	   the	   impact	  of	  NOLs	  on	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  effect	   is	  quite	  sensitive	   to	  
these	   assumptions.	   	   For	   example,	   assuming	   an	   employer	   STR	   of	   20%,	   a	   pre-­‐tax	  
interest	   rate	  of	  5%,	   and	  a	  10	  year	  deferral	  period,	   a	  10	  year	  NOL	  duration	  would	  
result	  in	  less	  than	  a	  2%	  improvement	  in	  deferred	  compensation	  economics	  arising	  
from	   an	   increased	   after-­‐tax	   rate	   of	   return,	   versus	   a	   9%	   improvement	   associated	  
with	  my	  default	  assumptions.	  
54	  Although	   the	   combined	  effects	   line	   in	  Figure	  4	  exhibits	   a	   slight	  bowing	   for	  NOL	  
durations	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  deferral	  period,	   in	  actuality	  the	  combined	  benefit	   in	  this	  
range	  is	  perfectly	  consistent	  and	  the	  bowing	  in	  the	  chart	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  
presence	  of	  NOLs	  the	  after-­‐tax	  discount	  rate	  is	  not	  exactly	  equal	  to	  the	  pre-­‐tax	  rate	  
multiplied	  by	  (1-­‐STR).	  	  See	  supra	  note	  33.	  	  To	  understand	  why	  the	  combined	  benefit	  
of	   the	   two	  effects	   is	  unaffected	  by	  NOL	  duration	   that	   extends	  beyond	   the	  deferral	  







4.	  Sensitivity	  to	  Tax	  and	  Interest	  Rates	  
	  
	   As	   noted	   above,	   the	   impact	   of	  NOLs	  on	   the	   joint	   tax	   advantage	   of	   deferred	  
compensation	   is	   sensitive	   to	   statutory	   corporate	   tax	   rates	   and	   to	   pre-­‐tax	   rates	   of	  
return	   on	   deferred	   amounts.	   	   While	   a	   30%	   STR	   and	   a	   10%	   interest	   rate	   are	  
convenient	  and	  perhaps	   reasonable	  assumptions	  over	   the	   long	   term,	  both	   tax	  and	  
interest	   rates	   are	   lower	   than	   these	   levels	   today.55	  	   To	   provide	   a	   sense	   of	   the	  
sensitivity	  of	  joint	  tax	  advantage	  to	  these	  assumptions,	  Figure	  5	  below	  replicates	  the	  
analysis	   presented	   in	   Figure	   4,	   substituting	   a	   20%	   STR	   and	   a	   5%	   pre-­‐tax	   rate	   of	  
return.	  	  Under	  these	  assumptions,	  the	  maximum	  improvement	  in	  joint	  tax	  advantage	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
deferral	  period	   sets	  aside	  and	   invests	  $1	   that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  paid	  as	   current	  
compensation.	  	  If	  paid	  currently,	  the	  deduction	  would	  yield	  an	  NOL	  of	  $1.	  	  Suppose	  
after	  10	  years	  of	   investment	   the	  gross	   amount	   is	  paid	   to	   the	  employee,	   yielding	  a	  
deduction	  of	  $1+r,	  where	  r	  is	  the	  pre-­‐tax	  return	  over	  the	  10	  year	  period,	  and	  income	  
over	  the	  period	  of	  r,	  for	  a	  net	  NOL	  of	  $1.	  	  In	  year	  10,	  the	  compensation	  has	  produced	  
an	  NOL	  of	  $1	  under	  either	  scenario	  and	  the	  employer	   is	   indifferent.	   	  Whether	  that	  
NOL	  is	  consumed	  in	  year	  10,	  11,	  12	  or	  later	  has	  no	  bearing	  on	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  
deferred	   versus	   current	   compensation,	   which	   is	   solely	   determined	   by	   the	  
improvement	  in	  the	  employee’s	  position.	  	  I	  thank	  Gregg	  Polsky	  for	  highlighting	  this	  
alternative	  analytical	  approach.	  
55	  The	  Tax	  Foundation	  puts	   the	  post-­‐TCJA	  population	  weighted	   average	   combined	  
U.S.	   state	  and	   federal	   statutory	   corporate	   tax	   rate	  at	  25.7%.	   	  Kyle	  Pomerleau,	  The	  
United	  States’	  Corporate	  Income	  Tax	  Rate	  is	  Now	  More	  in	  Line	  with	  Those	  Levied	  by	  
Other	  Major	  Nations	  (Feb.	  12,	  2018).	  
19	  
	  
of	  deferred	  compensation	   is	  1/3	  as	   large	   in	  the	  combined	  effect	  scenario	  as	  under	  





D.	   Implications	   for	   Deferred	   Compensation	   Arrangements	   (and	  
Complications)	  
	  
	   This	   section	   considers	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   forgoing	   for	   NOL	   firms	  
designing	   or	   negotiating	   compensation	   arrangements,	   as	   well	   as	   some	   further	  
complications.	   	   I	   begin	   with	   some	   general	   observations	   and	   then	   consider	   issues	  
specific	  to	  equity-­‐based	  pay	  and	  to	  NQDC.	  
	  
1.	  In	  General	  	  
	   	  
The	   rate	   of	   return	   effect	   depicted	   in	   Figures	   3	   through	   5	   is	   based	   on	   an	  
assumption	   that,	   absent	  NOLs,	   the	   employer	   pays	   tax	   at	   the	   statutory	   rate	   on	   the	  
returns	  on	   the	   funds	   that	  are	   freed	  up	  between	   the	  points	  of	  deferral	  and	  payout.	  	  
But	   in	   many	   cases	   employer	   after-­‐tax	   rates	   of	   return	   on	   deferred	   funds	   are	  
unaffected	  by	  NOLs.	  	  For	  example,	  deferred	  funds	  may	  be	  invested	  in	  the	  employer’s	  
own	  stock	  through	  tender	  offers	  or	  open	  market	  purchases,	   in	  which	  case	  gains	  or	  
losses	   on	   those	   holdings	   are	   not	   taxed	   per	   IRC	   §1032.56	  	   In	   this	   scenario,	   an	  NOL	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  this	  gambit	  was	  first	  recognized	  by	  Professor	  Daniel	  Halperin.	  	  
Daniel	  I.	  Halperin,	  Interest	  in	  Disguise:	  Taxing	  the	  “Time	  Value	  of	  Money,”	  95	  YALE	  L.J.	  
506,	  540	  (1986).	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position	  would	  not	  affect	  the	  firm’s	  after-­‐tax	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  the	  deferred	  funds	  as	  
the	  tax	  has	  already	  been	  reduced	  to	  zero.57	  	  	  
	  
As	   another	   example	   of	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   employer	   rates	   of	   return	   are	  
unaffected	   by	   NOLs,	   consider	   a	   deferred	   compensation	   plan	   sponsor	   that	   invests	  
deferred	   funds	   in	   corporate	   owned	   life	   insurance	   (COLI). 58 	  	   If	   operated	   in	  
accordance	   with	   IRC	   §101(j),	   COLI	   death	   benefits	   (and	   hence	   deferred	  
compensation	  returns)	  are	  untaxed	  and,	  again,	  the	  presence	  of	  NOLs	  would	  have	  no	  
impact	  on	  employer	  after-­‐tax	  rates	  of	  return.59	  	  	  
	  
In	  other	  cases,	  an	  employer’s	  pre-­‐NOL	  MTR	  on	  deferred	  amounts	  will	  not	  be	  
zero	  but	  will	  be	  less	  than	  the	  STR.	  	  Given	  the	  dividends	  received	  deduction,	  the	  pre-­‐
NOL	  MTR	   on	   dividends	   corporations	   receive	   from	   portfolio	   companies	   is	   already	  
reduced	  by	  half.60	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  impact	  of	  NOLs	  on	  an	  employer’s	  after	  tax	  return	  
on	  dividends	  would	  be	  half	  that	  depicted	  in	  Figures	  3	  through	  5.	  
	  
Thus,	  one	  can	  readily	  imagine	  scenarios	  in	  which	  NOLs	  would	  affect	  the	  value	  
of	  current	  and/or	  deferred	  deductions	  for	  compensation	  but	  not	  rates	  of	  return	  on	  
deferred	  amounts	  (or	  affect	  the	  latter	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree).	  	  However,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
think	   of	   a	   scenario	   in	   which	   the	   opposite	   would	   be	   true	   –	   in	   which	   NOLs	   would	  
affect	   after-­‐tax	   rates	   of	   return	   but	   not	   the	   relative	   value	   of	   current	   and	   deferred	  
deductions	   –	   at	   least	   within	   a	   single	   jurisdiction.	   	   So	   while	   isolating	   the	   rate	   of	  
return	  effect	  may	  be	  helpful	   for	  exposition,	   it	  does	  not	   reflect	  a	   single-­‐jurisdiction	  
real	   world	   scenario.	   	   The	   single-­‐jurisdiction	   real	   world	   scenarios	   likely	   are	  
represented	  by	  the	  deduction	  deferral	  effect	  alone	  and	  the	  two	  effects	  combined.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  possible,	  however,	  that	  a	  multinational	  company	  would	  face	  different	  tax	  
regimes	   for	   compensation	   deductions	   and	   the	   income	   earned	   on	   deferred	  
compensation.	   	  Presumably,	   compensation	  deductions	  would,	   in	   the	   first	   instance,	  
be	   permitted	   in	   the	   jurisdiction	   in	  which	   an	   employee	   is	   based	  while	   taxation	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  and	  other	  investment	  decisions	  are	  exogenous.	  	  As	  
described	   below,	   investment	   of	   deferred	   amounts	   in	   own	   company	   stock	   is	  more	  
commonly	   associated	   with	   equity	   compensation	   programs	   than	   with	   NQDC.	   	   See	  
infra	  Parts	  III.D.2&3.	  
58	  Surveys	   of	   NQDC	   plan	   sponsors	   suggest	   that	   COLI	   use	   is	   quite	   common	   in	   this	  
context.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  MULLINTBG,	  2014	  EXECUTIVE	  BENEFITS	  SURVEY,	  SUMMARY	  OF	  RESULTS	  9	  
(2015)	   (54%	   of	   surveyed	   companies	   that	   reported	   informally	   funding	   NQDC	  
obligations	  reported	  some	  use	  of	  COLI);	  NEWPORT	  GRP.,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  53	  (73%	  of	  
informal	  funders	  reported	  some	  use	  of	  COLI);	  see	  generally,	  Walker,	  supra	  note	  16,	  
at	  2104-­‐09.	  
59	  See	  Walker,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  2105-­‐07.	  
60	  IRC	   §243	   (allowing	   a	   deduction	   of	   50%	   of	   dividends	   received	   from	   portfolio	  
companies,	  i.e.,	  companies	  in	  which	  a	  taxpayer	  owns	  less	  than	  20%	  of	  the	  stock	  by	  




returns	   on	   deferred	   amounts	   would	   depend	   on	   where	   the	  money	   is	   invested.	   	   A	  
multinational	   could	  have	  NOLs	   in	   either	  or	  both	   jurisdictions.	   	   In	   such	  a	   scenario,	  
any	  of	  the	  three	  patterns	  depicted	  in	  Figures	  4	  or	  5	  represents	  a	  feasible	  outcome.	  
	  
	   It	  is	  worth	  emphasizing	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  NOLs	  on	  the	  relative	  value	  of	  grant	  
and	   payout-­‐date	   employer	   deductions	   –	   the	   deduction	   deferral	   effect	   –	   is	   highly	  
sensitive	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  period	  of	  deferral	  and	  NOL	  duration.61	  	  In	  
cases	  in	  which	  NOLs	  also	  affect	  employer	  rates	  of	  return,	  under-­‐estimation	  of	  NOL	  
duration	  would	  have	  no	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  economics	  of	  deferred	  compensation,	  
but	   in	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   economics	   turn	   solely	   on	   the	   deduction	   deferral	   effect,	  
under-­‐estimation	   of	   NOL	   duration	   could	   have	   a	   significant	   impact.	   	   Consider,	   for	  
example,	  a	  company	  that	  anticipates	  being	  in	  an	  NOL	  position	  for	  10	  years	  and	  that	  
sponsors	  NQDC	  with	  expected	  deferral	  of	  10	  years.	  	  Under	  the	  assumptions	  of	  a	  30%	  
STR	  and	  10%	  pre-­‐tax	  interest	  rate,	  if	  NOL	  duration	  actually	  extends	  to	  15	  years,	  the	  
company	  will	  have	  overestimated	  the	  impact	  of	  NOLs	  on	  NQDC	  economics	  by	  36%	  if	  
NOLs	   do	   not	   affect	   the	   company’s	   rates	   of	   return	   on	   the	   investment	   of	   deferred	  
funds.62	  
	  
	   To	   be	   sure,	   in	   none	   of	   the	   cases	   presented	   above	   does	   an	   employer	   NOL	  
position	  at	  the	  point	  of	  deferral	  result	  in	  deferred	  compensation	  economics	  that	  are	  
poorer	  than	  those	  pertaining	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  NOLs.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  NOLs	  may	  be	  
more	   or	   less	   beneficial,	   but	   they	   always	   improve	   the	   economics	   of	   deferred	  
compensation.	   	   The	   impact	   may	   be	   complex	   and	   unpredictable,	   but	   it	   is	   always	  
positive.	   	  While	   these	   points	   are	   correct,	   they	   are	   in	   part	   artifacts	   of	  my	   setup.	   	   I	  
have	  assumed	  a	  series	  of	  NOL	  years	  followed	  by	  profit	  years.	  	  Imagine	  instead	  a	  case	  
in	  which	  an	  employer	   is	   in	  an	  NOL	  position	  at	   the	  time	  of	  deferral.	   	  A	  year	  or	   two	  
later	   the	   employer	   returns	   to	   a	   profit	   position	   and	   deducts	   any	   NOLs.	   	   Prior	   to	  
payout,	   however,	   the	   employer	   returns	   to	   an	   NOL	   position	   and	   remains	   there	  
indefinitely.	   	   In	   this	   scenario,	   losses	   could	   well	   have	   a	   negative	   impact	   on	   the	  
economics	  of	  deferred	  compensation,	  as	  the	  employer’s	  grant	  year	  MTR	  and	  rates	  of	  
return	  would	  be	  only	  modestly	  affected	  by	  the	  grant	  year	  NOL,	  while	  its	  payout	  year	  
MTR	  would	  be	  significantly	  diminished	  by	  the	  later	  string	  of	  NOL	  years.	  	  While	  this	  
pattern	  of	   losses	  may	  be	  uncommon,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	  conventional	  wisdom	  that	  
being	   in	   a	   loss	   position	   in	   the	   year	   of	   a	   potential	   deferral	   makes	   deferred	  
compensation	  more	  attractive	  economically	  is	  an	  over	  simplification.	   	  This	  claim	  is	  
not	  necessarily	  true	  for	  companies	  that	  move	  in	  and	  out	  of	  loss	  positions.	  
	  
	   Having	   highlighted	   these	   general	   points,	   I	   now	   turn	   to	   more	   detailed	  
exploration	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  employer	  NOLs	  on	  equity-­‐based	  pay	  and	  NQDC.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  This	  follows	  from	  the	  non-­‐monotonic	  relationship	  between	  NOL	  duration	  and	  the	  
improvement	   in	   deferred	   compensation	   economics	   arising	   from	   the	   deduction	  
deferral	  effect.	  
62	  See	   Figure	   4.	   	   At	   a	   20%	   STR	   and	   5%	   pre-­‐tax	   interest	   rate,	   the	   overestimation	  
would	  be	  21%.	  	  See	  Figure	  5.	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   2.	  Equity-­‐Based	  Compensation	  
	  
	   The	  most	  important	  and	  noticeable	  change	  in	  equity-­‐based	  pay	  over	  the	  past	  
two	  decades	  has	  been	  the	  declining	  use	  of	  stock	  options	  and	  offsetting	  increased	  use	  
of	   performance	   share	   awards.63	  	   In	   1990,	   options	   accounted	   for	   over	   60%	   of	   the	  
total	  ex	  ante	  value	  of	  compensation	  granted	  to	  the	  median	  S&P	  500	  senior	  executive.	  	  
In	  2013	  options	  accounted	  for	  less	  than	  20%,	  while	  performance	  awards	  accounted	  
for	   over	   30%.64	  	   This	   transformation	   has	   had	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   deferral	  
periods.	   	   While	   options	   are	   typically	   exercisable	   for	   ten	   years,	   and	   typically	  
exercised	  within	  five	  or	  six	  years,	  performance	  awards	  typically	  cover	  a	  three-­‐year	  
period.65	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  performance	  share	  awards	  have	  displaced	  options,	  the	  
deferral	  period	  associated	  with	  equity	  pay	  has	  been	  reduced	  by	  about	  half.	  
	  
	   To	   be	   sure,	   start-­‐ups	   remain	   somewhat	   more	   likely	   than	   mature	   public	  
companies	  to	  issue	  options,	  and	  start-­‐ups	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  an	  NOL	  position,	  
but	  NOLs	  are	  by	  no	  means	  limited	  to	  start-­‐ups.66	  	  In	  any	  event,	  the	  equity-­‐based	  pay	  
in	   the	   typical	  modern	  executive	  pay	  packages	  does	  not	   involve	  extensive	  deferral,	  
which	  limits	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  NOLs	  on	  each	  of	  the	  elements	  that	  contribute	  to	  
the	  economic	  benefit	  of	  counterparty	  deferral.	  
	  
	   In	   addition,	   many	   companies	   that	   utilize	   equity-­‐based	   pay	   regularly	  
repurchase	  shares	  on	  the	  market	  to	  manage	  dilution.67	  	  These	  buybacks	  can	  result	  in	  
a	  zero	  tax	  rate	  on	  investment	  returns,	  with	  or	  without	  NOLs.68	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  NOLs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 	  See	   David	   I.	   Walker,	   The	   Way	   We	   Pay	   Now:	   Understanding	   and	   Evaluating	  
Performance-­‐Based	  Executive	  Pay,	  1	  J.	  LAW	  FIN.	  &	  ACCT.	  395	  (2016).	  
64	  Id.	  at	  405-­‐06.	  	  The	  adoption	  of	  performance	  shares	  and	  other	  performance-­‐based	  
pay	   instruments	   has	   been	   encouraged	   by	   the	   proxy	   advisors,	   principally	  
Institutional	  Shareholder	  Services	  (ISS).	  	  INSTITUTIONAL	  SHAREHOLDER	  SERVICES,	  UNITED	  
STATES	   PROXY	   VOTING	   GUIDELINES	   40-­‐49	   (Dec.	   6,	   2018)	   (outlining	   problematic	  
executive	   pay	   practices	   including	   pay	   insufficiently	   connected	   with	   company	  
performance).	  
65	  See	  supra	  note	  13.	  
66	  Recall	  the	  evidence,	  presented	  above,	  that	  50%	  to	  90%	  of	  Compustat	  firms	  have	  
reported	  NOLs	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  Heitzman	  &	  Lester,	  supra	  note	  2.	  
67	  See,	  e.g.,	  Richard	  Teitelbaum,	  Share	  Buybacks	  May	  Be	  Bad	  –	  Just	  Not	  for	  the	  Reasons	  
You	  Think,	  INSTITUTIONAL	  INVESTOR	  (March	  7,	  2019)	  (reporting	  that	  share	  buybacks	  by	  
S&P	  500	  companies	  reached	  a	  record	  $798	  billion	  in	  2018,	  accounting	  for	  more	  than	  
70%	  of	  the	  aggregate	  earnings	  of	  the	  companies	  in	  the	  index).	  
68	  As	  noted	  above,	  companies	  are	  not	  taxed	  on	  gains	  or	  losses	  on	  treasury	  shares	  per	  
IRC	   §1032.	   	   See	   supra	   text	   at	   note	   56.	   	   In	   theory,	   repurchasing	   company	   shares	  
eliminates	   taxation	   on	   equity	   compensation	   investment	   returns	   only	   if	   shares	   are	  
repurchased	  at	  the	  time	  of	  an	  equity	  grant,	  not	  at	  payout.	   	  The	  key	  question	  under	  
this	   approach	   is	   how	   freed	   up	   funds	   are	   invested	   between	   the	   point	   of	   deferral	  
(grant)	   and	   payout.	   	   Moreover,	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	   stock	   buybacks	   are	   more	  
closely	   associated	  with	   equity	   compensation	   payouts	   than	  with	   grants.	   	   See	   Ilona	  
23	  
	  
impact	   the	   advantage	   of	   deferral	   only	   through	   the	  deduction	  deferral	  mechanism.	  	  	  
Suppose,	   for	   example,	   that	   a	   stock	   grant	   vests	   in	   three	   years,	   that	   the	   statutory	  
employer	   tax	   rate	   is	   30%,	   that	   the	   pre-­‐tax	   interest	   rate	   is	   10%,	   and	   that	   the	  
employer	   repurchases	   its	   own	   shares	   at	   the	   time	   of	   grant,	   eliminating	   the	   rate	   of	  
return	  effect.	   	  The	  deduction	  deferral	  effect	  alone	  would	  improve	  the	  economics	  of	  
this	  equity	  pay,	  but	  at	  most	  by	  about	  8%,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2	  above.	  	  And	  even	  this	  
large	  a	  gain	  would	  be	  achieved	  only	  if	  NOL	  duration	  happened	  to	  match	  the	  deferral	  
period.	   	   A	   single	   year	   NOL	  would	   only	   improve	   the	   economics	   of	   the	   deferral	   by	  
about	  3%	  and,	   less	   obviously,	   but	  perhaps	  more	   importantly,	   a	  10-­‐year	   stretch	  of	  
NOL	   years	   would	   result	   in	   an	   improvement	   of	   only	   about	   4%	   in	   the	   benefit	   of	  
deferral.	  	  	  
	  
	   So	   should	  we	   expect	   companies	   to	   take	  NOLs	   into	   account	   in	   designing	   or	  
negotiating	  equity	  pay	  arrangements?	  	  I	  assume	  that	  willingness	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  
complexity	  of	  NOLs	  with	  respect	  to	  compensation	  decisions	  will	  turn	  in	  part	  on	  the	  
magnitude	   of	   the	   potential	   gain.	   	   In	   some	   cases,	   the	   potential	   gain	   may	   be	  
significant;	  in	  other	  cases,	  less	  so.	  	  	  
	  
For	  a	  company	  in	  the	  position	  described	  immediately	  above	  –	  making	  hedged	  
grants	  of	   three-­‐year	  stock	  awards	  –	   the	   impact	  of	  an	  NOL	  position	  at	  grant	  on	   the	  
overall	  economics	  of	  the	  deal	  is	  small	  and	  uncertain.	  	  One	  would	  not	  be	  surprised	  to	  
find	  such	  a	  firm	  falling	  back	  on	  the	  simple	  STR	  heuristic	  in	  making	  these	  decisions.	  
	  
The	  impact	  of	  NOLs	  would	  be	  greater	  for	  a	  cash-­‐poor	  start-­‐up	  company	  that	  
was	  considering	  issuing	  options	  and	  planned	  to	  use	  freed	  up	  funds	  in	  the	  business	  
instead	   of	   buying	   back	   shares.	   	   Options	   often	   remain	   outstanding	   for	   five	   years,	  
increasing	  the	  payoff	  to	  deferral	  somewhat,	  and	  absent	  hedging,	  both	  the	  deduction	  
deferral	  and	  rate	  of	  return	  effects	  would	  be	  in	  play.	   	  At	  my	  default	  tax	  and	  interest	  
rates,	   the	  potential	  payoffs	  as	  seen	  in	  Figure	  6	  below	  might	  be	  sufficient	  to	   induce	  
the	  start-­‐up	  to	  hire	  a	  consultant	  to	  do	  the	  math	  and	  help	  the	  firm	  think	  through	  the	  
various	  scenarios.	  	  Query,	  however,	  whether	  the	  driving	  force	  would	  be	  adequate	  at	  
current	  tax	  and	  interest	  rates.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Babenko,	   Share	   Repurchases	   and	   Pay-­‐Performance	   Sensitivity	   of	   Employee	  
Compensation	  Contracts,	   66	   J.	   FIN.	  117,	  118	   (2009)	   (finding	  a	  positive	   relationship	  
between	   share	   repurchase	   and	   stock	   option	   exercise);	   Alok	   Bhargava,	   Executive	  
Compensation,	   Share	   Repurchases	   and	   Investment	   Expenditures:	   Econometric	  
Evidence	   from	  US	   Firms,	   40	   REV.	  QUANT.	   FIN.	   ACCT.	   403,	   405	   (2013)	   (finding	   share	  
repurchase	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  option	  exercise	  but	  not	  grant).	  	  Nonetheless,	  stock	  
repurchase	   programs	   have	   become	   so	   large	   and	   popular	   in	   recent	   years	   that	   it	  
seems	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   a	   significant	   fraction	   of	   funds	   freed	   up	   through	  
equity	  issuance	  in	  lieu	  of	  cash	  is	  going	  into	  company	  stock,	  thus	  largely	  eliminating	  






	  	   3.	  NQDC	  
	  
	   NQDC	   typically	   involves	   longer	  periods	  of	  deferral,	   relative	   to	  equity-­‐based	  
pay,	   which	  magnifies	   the	   potential	   impact	   of	   NOLs	   on	   the	   economics	   of	   deferral.	  	  
This	   factor	   alone	   suggests	   that	   companies	   should	   more	   frequently	   take	   NOL	  
positions	  into	  account	  in	  designing	  and	  negotiating	  NQDC	  arrangements.69	  
	  
	   As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  equity-­‐based	  pay	  arrangements,	  some	  NQDC	  plan	  sponsors	  
will	   manage	   their	   investments	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	   reduce	   or	   eliminate	   tax	   on	  
investment	   returns,	   which,	   of	   course,	   limits	   or	   eliminates	   the	   impact	   of	   NOLs	   on	  
these	   returns.	   	   The	   main	   ways	   that	   NQDC	   plan	   sponsors	   do	   so	   are	   by	   investing	  
deferred	  funds	  in	  their	  own	  stock	  (relatively	  rare),	  investing	  in	  COLI	  products	  (quite	  
common),	   and	   purchasing	   dividend	   paying	   stocks	   entitling	   them	   to	   the	   dividend	  
received	  deduction	  (also	  common).70	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Firms	   can,	   for	   example,	   encourage	   NQDC	   participation	   through	   expansion	   or	  
augmentation	  of	   company	  matching	  programs.	   	  See	   Robert	  A.	  Miller,	  Nonqualified	  
Deferred	  Compensation	  Plans,	  in	  EXECUTIVE	  COMPENSATION	  211,	  215-­‐16	  (Yale	  D.	  
Tauber	  &	  Donald	  R.	  Levy	  eds.,	  2002).	  
70	  Most	  NQDC	  plans	  allow	  participants	  to	  select	   investment	  choices	  that	  determine	  
their	  promised	  payouts	  and	  many	  NQDC	  plan	  sponsors	  hedge	  the	  notional	  holdings	  
in	   participant	   accounts	   by	   purchasing	   identical	   securities	  with	   deferred	   amounts.	  	  
Companies	  do	   this	  primarily	   for	  accounting	   reasons;	  not	   for	   tax.	   	  As	  a	   result,	  plan	  
sponsors	  would	  tend	  to	  hold	  own	  company	  stock	  when	  participants	  have	  selected	  to	  
“invest”	  in	  company	  stock	  (rare)	  or	  other	  stocks	  or	  bonds	  that	  make	  up	  participant	  




	   However,	  the	  use	  of	  these	  strategies	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  random.	  	  For	  example,	  
COLI	   products	   are	   typically	   purchased	   specifically	   to	   minimize	   tax	   burdens	  
associated	  with	  plan	  sponsors’	  NQDC	  investment	  portfolios.	  	  A	  firm	  that	  is	  in	  an	  NOL	  
position,	  and	  expects	   to	  remain	  so	   for	  some	  time,	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  purchase	  a	  
COLI	  product	  to	  manage	  its	  investments.	  	  It	  could	  manage	  those	  investments	  and	  its	  
hedging	  activities	  through	  much	  cheaper,	  nominally	  taxable	  accounts.71	  	  	  
	  
	   It	  is	  also	  true	  that	  while	  the	  NOL	  impact	  on	  longer-­‐term	  deferrals	  is	  greater,	  
the	   firm’s	   NOL	   position	   will	   probably	   be	   less	   predictable	   over	   that	   period.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  prize	  is	  potentially	  substantial.	  	  Assuming	  that	  both	  the	  deduction	  
deferral	  effect	  and	  rate	  of	  return	  effect	  are	  in	  play,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  my	  stylized	  example	  
of	   10	   year	   deferral	   at	   a	   30%	   STR	   and	   a	   10%	   pre-­‐tax	   interest	   rate,	   NOLs	   could	  
increase	  the	  joint	  value	  of	  NQDC	  by	  over	  30%	  if	  NOL	  duration	  matches	  or	  exceeds	  
the	   deferral	   period.	   	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	   NOL	   boost	   falls	   to	   about	   10%	   under	   more	  
conservative	   (20%	  STR;	  5%	  pre-­‐tax	   interest	   rate)	  assumptions,	  but	  one	  could	  still	  
imagine	   companies	   taking	   these	   sorts	   of	   improvements	   into	   account	   in	   deferred	  
compensation	  planning,	  despite	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  simple	  STR	  heuristic.	  
	  
4.	   Other	   Factors	   Influencing	   the	   Attractiveness	   of	   Deferred	  
Compensation	  at	  Loss	  Firms	  
	  
	   In	  some	  cases	  the	  complexity	  and	  unpredictability	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  losses	  on	  
the	   economics	   of	   deferred	   compensation	   may	   cause	   these	   arrangements	   to	   be	  
somewhat	  less	  attractive	  for	  loss	  companies	  than	  might	  be	  envisioned	  at	  first	  blush.	  	  
This	   is	   not	   to	   suggest,	   however,	   that	   uncertain	   economic	   benefits	   are	   the	   only	  
obstacles	   to	   loss	   companies	   embracing	   these	   arrangements.	   	   One	   can	   think	   of	   at	  
least	   two	   additional	   factors	   that	  might	   discourage	   loss	   firms	   and	   their	   employees	  
from	   taking	   advantage	   of	   the	   opportunity	   to	   minimize	   their	   joint	   tax	   obligations	  
through	  deferred	  compensation.	  
	  
	   One	   factor	   is	   risk	  of	  nonpayment.	   	   Some	   loss	   firms	  may	  be	   financially	   solid	  
start-­‐ups	  that	  have	  not	  yet	  turned	  the	  tide	  to	  net	  profitability.	  	  Other	  loss	  firms	  may	  
be	  on	  a	  shakier	  footing	  financially.	   	  Employees	  of	  the	  latter	  may	  be	  loath	  to	  accept	  
the	  promise	  of	  an	  equity-­‐based	  payout	  in	  three	  to	  five	  years	  in	  lieu	  of	  current	  cash	  
or	  to	  voluntarily	  defer	  current	  compensation	  in	  exchange	  for	  an	  unsecured	  promise	  
to	  deliver	  funds	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
platform	  to	  hold	  these	  securities	  and	  manage	  these	  hedging	  activities.	  	  See	  generally,	  
Walker,	  supra	  note	  16.	  
71	  COLI	   products	   tend	   to	   be	   relatively	   expensive.	   	   The	   insurance	   companies	   that	  
market	  these	  products	  extract	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  buyer’s	  tax	  savings.	   	  Where	  there	  is	  
little	  or	  no	  tax	  to	  be	  saved,	  it	  makes	  little	  sense	  to	  purchase	  COLI.	  	  Id.	  at	  2106-­‐07.	  
26	  
	  
A	   second	   reason	   that	   loss	   firms	   might	   fail	   to	   fully	   exploit	   deferred	  
compensation	   opportunities	   might	   be	   an	   excessive	   focus	   on	   financial	   accounting	  
relative	  to	  after-­‐tax	  cash	  flows.	  	  NOLs	  that	  a	  company	  expects	  to	  fully	  deduct	  in	  the	  
future	  have	  no	   impact	  on	  book	  deductions	   for	  deferred	   compensation.72	  	   	   Prior	   to	  
the	  passage	  of	   the	  TCJA,	  NOLs	  expired	  after	  20	  years,	   and	   it	  would	  not	  have	  been	  
reasonable	   to	   assume	   full	   deductibility	   of	   NOLs	   in	   all	   cases.73	  	   In	   these	   cases,	  
companies	   were	   required	   to	   make	   valuation	   adjustments	   for	   their	   deferred	   tax	  
assets,	   which	   would	   have	   had	   some	   impact	   on	   book	   deductions	   for	   deferred	  
compensation	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   NOLs.74	  	   Nonetheless,	   a	   company	   that	   focused	  
solely	  or	  excessively	  on	  GAAP	  earnings	  would	  tend	  to	  ignore	  NOLs	  or	  discount	  their	  
impact	  significantly	  in	  evaluating	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  deferred	  compensation.	  	  	  
	  
Focusing	   on	   GAAP	   earnings	   instead	   of	   after-­‐tax	   cash	   flows	   in	   making	  
incremental	  decisions	   is	   inconsistent	  with	  basic	   corporate	   finance	   theory,	  but	   it	   is	  
apparently	   quite	   common.	   	   In	   a	   recent	   survey	   of	   corporate	   tax	   executives	   by	  
Graham,	  Hanlon,	  Shevlin,	  and	  Shroff,	  44.8%	  of	  respondents	  reported	  that	  they	  relied	  
primarily	   on	   statutory	   tax	   rates	   in	   making	   compensation	   decisions,	   while	   only	  
10.6%	  reported	  relying	  chiefly	  on	  marginal	  tax	  rates.75	  	  Of	  course,	  marginal	  tax	  rates	  
should	   be	   used	   in	   making	   incremental	   decisions,	   such	   as	   decisions	   regarding	  
compensation	  mix,	  and	  the	  authors	  suggest	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  reliance	  on	  statutory	  
rates	   may	   be	   a	   simplifying	   heuristic	   given	   the	   difficulty	   of	   determining	   marginal	  
rates	   under	   complex	   circumstances.	   	   But	   GAAP	   earnings	   are	   based	   on	   statutory	  
rates,	  so	  another	  possibility	  is	  that	  these	  firms	  focus	  primarily	  on	  maximizing	  GAAP	  
earnings	  rather	  than	  maximizing	  after-­‐tax	  cash	  flows.	  
	   	  
IV.	  Empirical	  Research	  on	  the	  Role	  of	  Taxation	  in	  Compensation	  Design	  
	  
	   There	   is	   a	   large	   finance	   and	   accounting	   literature	   that	   investigates	   the	  
relationship	  between	  company	  tax	  status	  and	  the	  use	  of	  equity	  and	  other	  deferred	  
compensation.	  	  This	  literature	  has	  come	  in	  two	  waves.	  	  The	  first	  wave	  followed	  the	  
explosion	   in	  stock	  option	  use	   in	  the	  1990s	  as	  researchers	  sought	  to	  determine	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  companies	  respond	  to	  taxes	  in	  deciding	  whether	  to	  use	  equity	  pay	  
and	  how	  to	  design	  that	  pay.	   	  A	  second	  wave	  followed	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis	  and	  
was	  focused	  primarily	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  deferred	  compensation	  held	  by	  
executives	   and	   risk	   taking	   incentives,	   but	   many	   studies	   included	   controls	   for	  
company	  tax	  status.	  	  This	  Part	  considers	  what	  these	  studies	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  impact	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 	  R.	   Lee	   Nunn,	   Financial	   Accounting	   and	   NQDC,	   in	   TAXATION	   AND	   FUNDING	   OF	  
NONQUALIFIED	  DEFERRED	  COMPENSATION	  295	  (Maria	  J.	  Aspinwall	  &	  Michael	  G.	  Goldstein	  
ed.,	  2nd	  ed.	  2012).	  
73	  See,	   e.g.,	   Polsky,	   supra	   note	   31,	   at	   419	   (noting	   that	   the	   time	   to	   profitability	   for	  
start-­‐ups	  is	  “expected	  to	  be	  long,	  often	  much	  longer	  than	  [the]	  investment	  horizon	  of	  
investors”).	  
74	  Presumably,	  NOLs	  will	   not	   result	   in	   valuation	   adjustments	   going	   forward,	   since	  
NOL	  carryforwards	  no	  longer	  expire.	  	  	  
75	  Graham	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  3141.	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of	   NOLs	   and	   MTRs	   on	   deferred	   compensation	   use	   as	   well	   as	   the	   prospects	   for	  
identifying	  that	  impact	  through	  existing	  and	  improved	  empirical	  methods.76	  	  	  
	  
A.	   Do	   Researchers	   Understand	   the	   Tax	   Implications	   of	   Deferred	  
Compensation?	  
	  
As	   a	   starting	   point,	   it	   is	   worth	   asking	   whether	   accounting	   and	   finance	  
researchers	   fully	   understand	   the	   tax	   implications	   of	   these	   complex	   deferred	  
compensation	  arrangements.	   	   In	   this	   case,	   I	   believe	   the	  answer	   is	   “yes	   and	  no”	  or	  
“yes	   to	   a	   limited	   extent.”	   	   As	   Professors	   Shackelford	   and	   Shevlin	   suggest,	   “an	  
appreciation	  of	  the	  nuances	  of	  the	  tax	  law	  stands	  as	  a	  substantial	  barrier	  for	  entry	  
for	  many	  accounting	  researchers.”77	  	  	  
	  
Scholes	  and	  Wolfson	  promulgated	  a	  framework	  of	  analysis	  for	  the	  role	  of	  tax	  
in	   corporate	   finance	   decisions	   in	   their	   1992	   textbook,	   “Taxation	   and	   Business	  
Strategy.”78	  	   Their	   “all	   parties,	   all	   taxes,	   and	   all	   costs”	   framework	   is	   basically	   self-­‐
explanatory;	  it	  requires	  researchers	  to	  identify	  and	  understand	  each	  of	  the	  parties,	  
taxes,	  and	  costs	  involved	  in	  financing	  decisions.	  	  Scholes	  and	  Wolfson	  clearly	  laid	  out	  
the	   “all	   parties,	   all	   taxes”	   economics	   of	   deferred	   compensation	   relative	   to	   current	  
compensation	   in	   their	   1992	   book,	   and	   the	   analysis	   has	   been	   included	   in	   later	  
editions,	  as	  well.79	  	  Most	  published	  research	  in	  this	  area	  embraces	  that	  framework.	  
	  
That	   is	   to	  say	   that	  researchers	   investigating	  cross-­‐sectional	  variation	   in	   the	  
use	  of	  equity	  or	  other	  deferred	  compensation	  recognize	  that	  variations	  in	  corporate	  
tax	  rates	  may	  be	  an	  explanatory	  factor.80	  	  While	  some	  researchers	  seem	  to	  recognize	  
that	   employer	   tax	   rates	   can	   affect	   the	   rate	   of	   return	   on	   deferred	   funds,81	  most	  
appear	   to	   focus	  on	  Scholes	  and	  Wolfson’s	  observation	  that	  deferred	  compensation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Note	  that	  this	  Part	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  provide	  an	  exhaustive	  survey	  of	  the	  finance	  
and	  accounting	  literature	  on	  the	  role	  of	  taxation	  in	  deferred	  compensation.	  	  For	  such	  
a	  review,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Douglas	  A.	  Shackelford	  &	  Terry	  Shevlin,	  Empirical	  Tax	  Research	  in	  
Accounting,	  31	  J.	  ACCT.	  &	  ECON.	  321	  (2001).	  	  
77	  Id.	  at	  324.	  
78	  MYRON	   S.	   SCHOLES	   &	   MARK	   A.	   WOLFSON,	   TAXES	   AND	   BUSINESS	   STRATEGY:	   A	   PLANNING	  
APPROACH	  (1st	  ed.,	  1992).	  
79	  See,	  e.g.,	  SCHOLES	  ET	  AL,	  supra	  note	  1.	  
80	  Consistent	   with	   the	   “all	   parties”	   framework,	   researchers	   also	   recognize	   that	  
employee	   tax	   rates	   affect	   the	   economics	   of	   deferred	   compensation.	   	   Longitudinal	  
studies	   take	   employee	   tax	   rates	   into	   account	   but	   cross-­‐sectional	   variations	   in	  
employee	  rates	  are	  unobservable	  and	  are	  not	  considered	  in	  analyses	  of	  this	  nature.	  	  
Moreover,	   it	   is	   probably	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   most	   executives	   pay	   tax	   on	  
equity	   and	   deferred	   compensation	   at	   the	   highest	   marginal	   rates.	   	   Longitudinal	  
analysis	  of	  deferred	  compensation	  practices	  is	  briefly	  considered	  infra	  Part	  V.	  
81 	  See,	   e.g.,	   Brian	   J.	   Hall	   &	   Jeffrey	   B.	   Liebman,	   The	   Taxation	   of	   Executive	  
Compensation,	  in	  14	  TAX	  POLICY	  AND	  THE	  ECONOMY	  [SSRN	  pp.	  10-­‐11]	  (2000).	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tends	   to	   be	   advantaged	  when	   the	   employer’s	   tax	   rate	   is	   expected	   to	   be	   higher	   at	  
payout	   than	  at	   the	   time	  of	  deferral.82	  	  To	  some	  extent,	   this	   is	  a	   “no	  harm,	  no	   foul”	  
type	   situation,	   because,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   NOLs	   at	   the	   time	   of	   deferral	   tend	   to	  
improve	  employer	  after-­‐tax	  rates	  of	  return	  on	  deferred	  funds	  as	  well	  as	  the	  relative	  
value	   of	   their	   deduction	   for	   deferred	   compensation.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   I	   see	   no	  
recognition	   in	   this	   literature	   that	   the	   implications	   of	   NOLs	   on	   deferred	  
compensation	   economics	   depends	   in	   any	  way	   on	   how	   employers	   handle	   deferred	  
amounts,	  e.g.,	  hedging	  equity	  grants	  or	  investing	  in	  COLI	  products	  to	  manage	  NQDC	  
accounts.	  
	  
B.	  Proxies	  for	  Employer	  Tax	  Status	  
	  
Because	  employer	  marginal	  tax	  rates	  are	  not	  directly	  observable,	  researchers	  
employ	   various	   proxies	   for	   those	   rates.	   	   One	   of	   the	   simplest	   and	  most	   commonly	  
used	  proxies	  is	  an	  indicator	  or	  “dummy”	  variable	  reflecting	  the	  existence,	  or	  not,	  of	  
an	  NOL	  for	  a	  given	  company	  in	  a	  given	  year.	  	  The	  existence	  of	  an	  NOL	  is	  associated	  
with	  a	  low	  MTR;	  while	  the	  absence	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  high	  MTR.	  	  Companies	  report	  
NOL	  positions	  in	  their	  financial	  statements	  and	  these	  disclosed	  NOLs	  are	  reported	  in	  
the	  Compustat	  database.83	  	  	  
	  
	   Some	  researchers,	   following	  the	  suggestion	  of	  Professor	  George	  Plesko,	  add	  
some	  nuance	  to	  this	  approach	  by	  adopting	  a	  binary	  dummy	  variable.	  	  Under	  Plesko’s	  
approach,	   a	   firm	   is	   designated	   as	   having	   a	   low	   MTR	   in	   a	   year	   if,	   in	   each	   of	   the	  
preceding	   three	   years,	   it	   reports	   an	   NOL	   and	   negative	   taxable	   income.	   	   A	   firm	   is	  
designated	  as	  having	  a	  high	  MTR	   if	   it	  has	  no	  NOLs	  and	  positive	   taxable	   income	   in	  
each	  of	  the	  three	  preceding	  years.	  	  In	  other	  cases,	  a	  company	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  
neither	  a	  high	  nor	  a	  low	  MTR.84	  
	  
	   A	   more	   sophisticated	   approach	   is	   to	   create	   a	   simulation	   that	   forecasts	   a	  
firm’s	  future	  taxable	  income	  and	  factors	  NOLs	  into	  predicted	  taxes	  and	  marginal	  tax	  
rates.	  	  Some	  researchers	  have	  employed	  simulations	  to	  estimate	  current	  year	  MTRs,	  
while	  a	  still	  more	  sophisticated	  approach,	  adopted	  by	  few,	  is	  to	  estimate	  MTRs	  both	  
for	  the	  current	  year,	  the	  year	  of	  the	  possible	  deferral,	  and	  the	  year	  of	  payout.85	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  See,	   e.g.,	   John	   E.	   Core	   &	   Wayne	   R.	   Guay,	   Stock	   Option	   Plans	   for	   Non-­‐executive	  
Employees,	  61	  J.	  FIN.	  ECON.	  253,	  260	  (2001).	  
83	  Not	  without	  error.	  	  See	  Shackelford	  &	  Shevlin,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  366;	  Heitzman	  &	  
Lester,	  supra	  note	  2.	  
84	  George	  A.	  Plesko,	  An	  Evaluation	  of	  Alternative	  Measures	  of	  Corporate	  Tax	  Rates,	  35	  
J.	   ACCT.	   &	   ECON.	   201	   (2003).	   	   Plesko	   finds	   that	   this	   binary	   variable	   is	   closely	  
correlated	  with	  more	  sophisticated	  estimations	  of	  MTR,	  but	  Shackelford	  and	  Shevlin	  
criticize	  this	  approach.	  	  Shackelford	  &	  Shevlin,	  supra	  note	  76.	  
85 	  See,	   e.g.,	   Jeffrey	   R.	   Austin	   et	   al,	   The	   Choice	   of	   Incentive	   Stock	   Options	   vs.	  




	   Shackelford	   and	   Shevlin	   argue	   that	   as	   a	   general	   matter	   simulated	   MTRs	  
should	  be	  preferred	   to	   the	  use	  of	  NOL	  dummy	  variables,	   including	  Plesko’s	  binary	  
NOL/taxable	  income	  dummies.86	  	  The	  existence	  of	  an	  NOL	  seems	  a	  particularly	  poor	  
proxy	   for	   the	   attractiveness	   of	   deferred	   compensation,	   which	   depends	   on	   the	  
employer’s	   MTR	   at	   grant	   and	   at	   payout,	   and	   which	   can	   bear	   a	   non-­‐monotonic	  
relationship	   to	  NOL	   duration.	   	   Presumably,	   the	   idea	   behind	   classifying	   firms	  with	  
three	  years	  of	  NOLs	  and	  three	  years	  of	  negative	  taxable	  income	  as	  low	  MTR	  firms	  is	  
to	  identify	  firms	  with	  particularly	  low	  current	  year	  MTRs.	  	  This	  might	  be	  a	  sensible	  
approach	   for	   cases	   in	  which	   the	   relationship	   between	  MTR	   and	   cost	   or	   benefit	   is	  
monotonic,	  but,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  if	  a	  firm’s	  MTRs	  do	  not	  impact	  its	  after	  tax	  rate	  of	  
return	   on	   deferred	   funds,	   the	   tax	   advantage	   of	   deferred	   compensation	   begins	   to	  
decline	  if	  NOL	  duration	  exceeds	  the	  deferral	  period.	  
	  
To	  my	  knowledge	  researchers	   investigating	  the	  impact	  of	  taxes	  on	  deferred	  
compensation	  have	  not	  employed	  either	  NOL	  duration	  or	  dummy	  variables	  for	  the	  
existence	  of	  NOLs	  at	   the	   time	  of	  payout	  as	  alternatives	  or	   supplements	   to	   current	  
year/grant	  date	  dummies.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  payout	  date	  data	  reflect	  ex	  post	  observations	  
and	   questions	   might	   arise	   regarding	   endogeneity,	   but	   this	   would	   still	   seem	   to	  
represent	   an	   improvement	   over	   the	   use	   of	   current	   year	   NOL	   dummies	   alone.	   	   Of	  
course,	   the	   use	   of	   an	   NOL	   duration	   or	   NOL	   payout	   dummy	   would	   require	  
researchers	  to	  estimate	  the	  period	  of	  deferral.	  
	  
In	   any	   event,	   given	   the	   complex	   relationship	   between	   the	   tax	   advantage	   of	  
deferred	  compensation	  and	  NOL	  duration/grant	  date	  MTR,	  the	  use	  of	  simulations	  to	  
estimate	   grant	   date	   and	   payout	   MTRs	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   particularly	   valuable.	  	  
Presumably,	  simulations	  could	  also	  be	  used	  to	  estimate	  employer	  after-­‐tax	  rates	  of	  
return	   on	   various	   investments,	   estimates	   that	   reflect	   a	   firm’s	  NOL	   position	   in	   the	  
year	  of	  grant.	  	  
	  
C.	  Specific	  Tax	  Proxies	  and	  Results	  of	  Empirical	  Investigations	  into	  the	  Role	  of	  
Taxation	  in	  Compensation	  Design	  
	  
	   1.	  	  Equity	  Compensation	  Studies	  
	  
	   While	   some	   of	   the	   earliest	   analyses	   of	   the	   determinants	   of	   equity	  
compensation	  used	  employer	  NOL	  dummies,	  later	  studies	  utilized	  MTR	  simulations.	  	  
Neither	   approach,	   however,	   has	   resulted	   in	   consistent	   findings	   of	   statistically	  
significant	   associations	   between	   employer	   MTR	   and	   reliance	   upon	   or	   design	   of	  
equity	  pay.	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(estimating	  stock	  option	  exercise	  dates	  and	  company	  MTRs	  at	  the	  time	  of	  estimated	  
exercise).	  
86	  Shackelford	  &	  Shevlin,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  367.	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   As	  examples	  of	  the	  former	  approach,	  Professor	  David	  Yermack	  used	  a	  simple	  
NOL	  dummy	  variable	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  employer	  tax	  status	  in	  his	  1995	  analysis	  of	  the	  
determinants	   of	   CEO	   stock	   option	   awards,	   and	   he	   failed	   to	   find	   a	   statistically	  
significant	   relationship.87	  	   In	   their	   2001	   analysis	   of	   the	   determinants	   of	   options	  
granted	   to	  non-­‐executives,	  Professors	   John	  Core	  and	  Wayne	  Guay	  used	   the	  Plesko	  
dummies,	  combining	  multi-­‐year	  NOLs	  and	  negative	  taxable	  income	  into	  proxies	  for	  
low	  and	  high	  MTR.	   	  They	  found	  that	  high	  MTR	  companies	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  make	  
use	  of	  options,	  but	  the	  relationship	  between	  low	  MTR	  firms	  and	  option	  use	  was	  not	  
statistically	  significant.88	  	  Core	  and	  Guay’s	  2001	  study	  is	  also	  an	  example	  of	  the	  use	  
of	  simulations	  to	  estimate	  MTRs.	   	  Core	  and	  Guay	  reported	  that	  they	  repeated	  their	  
analysis	  using	  Professor	  Graham’s	  simulated	  MTRs,	  and	  found	  similar	  results.89	  	  	  
	  
	   Unfortunately,	  many	  of	  the	  equity	  compensation	  studies	  are	  complicated	  by	  
the	   fact	   that	   companies	   can	   issue	   either	   or	   both	   of	   two	   types	   of	   options	   –	   non-­‐
qualified	  options	   (NQOs),	  which	   result	   in	   the	  kind	  of	   counterparty	  deferral	   that	   is	  
the	   focus	   of	   this	   article,	   and	   incentive	   stock	   options	   (ISOs),	   which	   provide	  
preferential	   tax	   treatment	   to	   employee-­‐recipients	   but	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   employer	  
deductions.90	  	  Employers	  receive	  no	  deduction	  at	  any	  time	  with	  respect	  to	  ISOs	  that	  
qualify	   for	   favorable	   employee	   tax	   treatment.91	  	   For	   example,	   Professors	   Bryan,	  
Hwang,	   and	   Lilien	   also	   employed	   Graham’s	   simulation	   in	   their	   2000	   study	   of	   the	  
determinants	   of	   CEO	   equity-­‐based	   pay. 92 	  	   While	   they	   found	   that	   high	   MTR	  
companies	   were	   less	   likely	   to	   use	   options	   (as	   predicted),93	  it	   was	   unclear	   if	   this	  
result	  was	   driven	   by	   the	   complete	   loss	   of	   deductions	   associated	  with	   ISOs.	   	   They	  
found	  no	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  between	  employer	  MTR	  and	  grants	  of	  
restricted	  stock,	  which	  provides	  a	  more	  straightforward	  test	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  NOLs	  
on	  deferred	  compensation.94	  	  	  
	  
Similarly,	   Professors	  Austin,	  Gaver,	   and	  Gaver	  used	  a	   simulation	  procedure	  
developed	  by	  Professor	  Terry	  Shevlin	  in	  analyzing	  company	  decisions	  to	  grant	  ISOs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  David	   Yermack,	  Do	  Corporations	  Award	  CEO	   Stock	  Options	  Effectively?,	   39	   J.	   FIN.	  
ECON.	  237	  (1995).	  
88	  Core	  &	  Guay,	  supra	  note	  82,	  at	  275.	  
89	  Id.	  
90	  IRC	  §422	  specifies	   the	   conditions	   for	   ISO	   treatment.	   	   If	   the	   requirements	  of	   IRC	  
§422	   are	   met,	   including	   post-­‐exercise	   stock	   holding	   requirements,	   employees	  
exercising	  ISOs	  are	  not	  taxed	  until	  they	  sell	  the	  underlying	  shares	  and	  at	  that	  time	  
they	   are	   taxed	   at	   the	   capital	   gains	   rate	   on	   their	   entire	   gain,	   rather	   than	   at	   the	  
ordinary	  income	  rate.	  	  IRC	  §421(a).	  
91	  IRC	  §421(a).	  
92	  Stephen	   Bryan	   et	   al,	   CEO	   Stock-­‐Based	   Compensation:	   An	   Empirical	   Analysis	   of	  
Incentive-­‐Intensity,	   Relative	   Mix,	   and	   Economic	   Determinants,	   73	   J.	   BUS.	   661,	   670	  
(2000).	  
93	  Id.	  at	  663.	  
94	  Id.	  at	  686.	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or	  NQOs.95	  	   Austin,	   Gaver,	   and	  Gaver	   used	   the	   simulation	   to	   estimate	   the	   exercise	  
date	  of	  the	  options	  and	  the	  MTR	  at	  that	  time.	   	  What	  they	  found,	  however,	  was	  that	  
firms	  tended	  to	  issue	  ISOs	  despite	  a	  combined	  tax	  disadvantage.96	  	  Summing	  up	  the	  
evidence	   regarding	   company	   choices	   between	   ISOs	   and	   NQOs,	   Shackelford	   and	  
Shevlin	   concluded,	   “if	  we	  were	   forced	   to	  make	  a	   judgment	  on	   the	   current	   state	  of	  
knowledge,	  we	  would	   interpret	  the	  evidence	  as	  consistent	  with	  taxes	  not	  being	  an	  
important	  determinant.”97	  	  	  
	  
	   As	  this	  small	  sample	  of	  studies	  suggests,	  some	  researchers	  investigating	  the	  
determinants	   and	   design	   of	   equity	   pay	   have	   employed	   MTR	   simulations	   as	  
suggested	   in	   the	   literature.	   	   Despite	   this,	   results	   have	   been	   mixed.	   	   It	   does	   not	  
appear	   that	   cross-­‐sectional	   variation	   in	  MTR	   is	   a	   large	   factor	   in	  equity	  pay	  use	  or	  
design.	   	  There	  could	  be	  several	  reasons	  for	  this.	   	  The	  ISO/NQSO	  decision	  might	  be	  
driven	  by	  executive	  preferences	  dominating	  corporate	  costs	  or,	  relatedly,	  a	  desire	  to	  
camouflage	  compensation.98	  	  As	   I’ve	  suggested	  above,	  however,	   it	  may	  be	   the	  case	  
that	  MTR	  variations	  simply	  are	  not	  that	  significant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  relatively	  short-­‐
term	  equity	  pay	   arrangements,	   particularly	   hedged	   grants	   of	   equity.	   	  Of	   course,	   it	  
could	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  proxies	  for	  and	  simulations	  of	  corporate	  MTRs	  have	  not	  
been	  up	  to	  the	  task.	  	  	  
	  
	   2.	  Nonqualified	  Deferred	  Compensation/Inside	  Debt	  Studies	  
	  
	   A	  number	  of	  studies	  of	  non-­‐equity	  deferred	  compensation	  were	  published	  in	  
the	  wake	  of	  the	  2007-­‐2008	  financial	  crisis.	  	  The	  idea	  behind	  most	  of	  these	  studies	  is	  
that	  non-­‐qualified	  deferred	  compensation	  represents	  “inside	  debt”	   in	  the	  company	  
that	  might	  help	   align	   executive	   incentives	  with	   those	  of	   debt-­‐holders	   and	  act	   as	   a	  
check	  on	  the	  sort	  of	  risk	  taking	  incentives	  that	  shareholders	  might	  prefer	  and	  that	  
would	   be	   incentivized	   by	   stock	   options.	   	   As	   in	   the	   case	   of	   equity-­‐pay	   studies,	  
researchers	  in	  this	  area	  generally	  understand	  that	  employer	  MTR	  could	  help	  explain	  
cross-­‐sectional	   variation	   in	   the	   use	   of	   inside	   debt.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   tax	   analysis	   is	  
essentially	   the	   same	   as	   in	   the	   earlier	   wave	   of	   equity	   pay	   studies.	   	   Researchers	  
working	  in	  this	  area	  have	  employed	  NOL	  proxies	  and	  have	  not	  employed	  simulated	  
MTRs	   in	   these	   studies.	   	   Perhaps	   unsurprisingly,	   these	   studies	   have	   not	   found	  
statistically	   significant	   relationships	   between	   tax	   status	   and	   the	   prevalence	   of	  
deferred	  compensation.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Austin	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  85,	  at	  2.	  
96	  Id.	  at	  3.	  
97	  Shackelford	  &	  Shevlin,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  331.	  
98 	  Although	   employers	   generally	   sacrifice	   their	   deduction	   for	   compensation	  
conferred	   through	   ISOs,	  employees	  generally	  benefit	   from	  ISO	  tax	   treatment	   if	   the	  
shares	  increase	  in	  value	  and	  the	  capital	  gains	  rate	  is	  less	  than	  the	  rate	  on	  ordinary	  
income.	  	  SCHOLES	  ET	  AL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  193.	  	  This	  benefit	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  overlooked	  by	  
outside	  observers	  in	  assessing	  overall	  compensation.	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   For	   example,	  Professors	   Sundaram	  and	  Yermack	  used	  an	  NOL	  dummy	  as	   a	  
proxy	  for	  tax	  status	  in	  their	  2007	  analysis	  of	  the	  determinants	  of	  CEO	  non-­‐qualified	  
executive	  pension	  levels.	  	  The	  NOL	  dummy	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant	  in	  any	  of	  
their	   regressions	   and	   even	   carried	   an	   inconsistent	   sign.99	  	   Professor	   Cen	   similarly	  
employed	  an	  NOL	  dummy	  in	  his	  2011	  study	  of	  the	  determinants	  of	  CEO	  inside	  debt,	  
a	   variable	   that	   generally	   was	   not	   statistically	   significant.100	  	   In	   a	   2010	   paper,	  
Professor	  Gerakos	  investigated	  the	  tradeoff	  that	  is	  made	  between	  CEO	  pay	  and	  non-­‐
qualified	   pension	   benefits.101	  	   He	   recognized	   that	   low	  MTR	   firms	   should	   be	  more	  
likely	   to	   favor	   deferred	   compensation	   but	   he	   found	   that	   companies	   providing	  
pensions	  are	  significantly	   less	   likely	  to	  have	  NOLs	  for	  the	  three	  prior	  years.102	  	  In	  a	  
2012	  paper,	  Professors	  Alces	  and	  Galle	  investigated	  cross-­‐sectional	  variation	  in	  the	  
fraction	  of	  compensation	  that	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  inside	  debt.103	  	  They	  included	  lags	  of	  
firm	  tax	  status	  in	  their	  regressions,	  again	  using	  NOLs	  as	  proxies	  for	  low	  MTRs.	  	  They	  
explained	  that	  they	  did	  not	  expect	  to	  find	  a	  statistically	  significant	  association	  since	  
the	  bulk	  of	  compensation	  consists	  of	  equity	  and	  inside	  debt,	  both	  of	  which	  represent	  
deferred	  compensation,	   the	  benefit	  of	  which	  may	   increase	  with	  reduced	  employer	  
MTRs.104	  	   And,	   indeed,	   they	   did	   not	   find	   the	   tax	   proxy	   to	   be	   a	   significant	   control	  
variable.105	  	   Like	   the	   other	   studies	   noted	   here,	   however,	   they	   did	   not	   employ	  
simulated	  MTRs.	  
	  
D.	  	  The	  Empirical	  Road	  Ahead	  	  	  
	  
	   It	  is	  disappointing	  that	  the	  inside	  debt	  studies	  employed	  only	  low	  power	  NOL	  
dummy	   variables	   in	   testing	   whether	   employer	   tax	   status	   helps	   explain	   cross-­‐
sectional	  variation	  in	  the	  use	  of	  deferred	  compensation.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  from	  
these	  studies	  whether	  companies	  ignore	  or	  disregard	  their	  particular	  tax	  positions	  
in	   making	   deferred	   compensation	   decisions	   or	   whether	   researchers	   just	   aren’t	  
picking	   it	   up.	   	   It	   is	   particularly	   disappointing	   because,	   as	   I’ve	   argued	   above,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Rangarajan	   K.	   Sundaram	  &	  David	   L.	   Yermack,	  Pay	  Me	  Later:	   Inside	  Debt	  and	   Its	  
Role	  in	  Managerial	  Compensation,	  62	  J.	  FIN.	  1551,	  1574	  (2007).	  
100	  Wei	  Cen,	  The	  Determinants	  of	  CEO	  Inside	  Debt	  and	  its	  Components	  48-­‐51	  (working	  
paper,	  2011).	  
101	  Joseph	  Gerakos,	  Chief	  Executive	  Officers	  and	  the	  Pay-­‐Pension	  Tradeoff,	  9	  J.	  PENSION	  
ECON.	  &	  FIN.	  303	  (2010).	  
102	  Id.	  at	  316.	  
103	  Kelli	  A.	  Alces	  &	  Brian	  D.	  Galle,	  The	  False	  Promise	  of	  Risk-­‐Reducing	  Incentive	  Pay:	  
Evidence	   from	   Executive	   Pensions	   and	   Deferred	   Compensation,	   38	   J.	   CORP.	   L.	   53	  
(2012).	  
104	  Id.	  at	  96-­‐97.	  	  While	  Alces	  and	  Galle	  are	  right	  that	  employer	  tax	  status	  could	  affect	  
the	  use	  of	  equity	  pay	  as	  well	  as	  of	  non-­‐equity	  deferred	  compensation,	  I	  would	  expect	  
the	   impact	   of	   low	   employer	   MTRs	   to	   be	   greater	   for	   non-­‐equity	   deferred	  
compensation	  given	  its	  generally	  longer	  time	  frame	  and	  the	  greater	  likelihood	  that	  
equity	  grants	  would	  be	  hedged.	  	  	  
105	  Id.	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potential	   impact	   of	   employer	   tax	   status	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   greater	   for	   non-­‐equity	  
deferred	  compensation	  than	  for	  equity	  pay	  given	  the	  differences	  in	  typical	  deferral	  
periods	   and	   likely	   hedging	   patterns.106	  	   But	   that	   is	   by	   no	  means	   a	   slam-­‐dunk.	   	   As	  
suggested	  above,	  firms	  with	  large	  NOL	  positions	  may	  be	  on	  shakier	  financial	  footing	  
than	   other	   firms	   causing	   employees	   to	   think	   twice	   about	   entering	   into	   lengthy	  
unsecured	   deferred	   compensation	   arrangements.107	  	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   predict	   the	  
relationship,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  worth	  more	  rigorous	  investigation.	  
	  
	   Ideally,	  researchers	  investigating	  the	  role	  of	  employer	  tax	  status	  in	  deferred	  
compensation	  arrangements	  would	  simulate	  employer	  MTRs	  at	  the	  time	  of	  deferral	  
and	   at	   the	   time	   of	   payout,	   as	   estimates	   of	   both	   are	   needed	   to	   determine	   the	  
deduction	  deferral	   effect.	   	  A	   composite	  of	   the	   two	  could	  be	  used	   to	  determine	   the	  
rate	  of	  return	  effect.	  	  Apparently,	  estimation	  of	  MTR	  at	  payout	  has	  only	  rarely	  been	  
attempted	   in	   the	   literature	   thus	   far.108	  	   Of	   course,	   doing	   so	   would	   require	   an	  
estimation	  of	  the	  period	  of	  deferral.	   	  In	  the	  case	  of	  restricted	  stock	  or	  performance	  
shares	  with	  fixed	  terms,	  this	  would	  be	  straightforward.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  option	  plans,	  
one	  would	  need	  to	  estimate	  years	  to	  exercise.	  	  And	  in	  the	  case	  of	  NQDC,	  one	  would	  
need	   to	   estimate	   years	   to	   payout,	   which	   is	   somewhat	   more	   difficult	   but	   not	  
unmanageable.109	  
	  
So	  is	  this	  the	  ideal	  solution	  –	  just	  use	  simulated	  MTRs?	  	  Actually,	  a	  number	  of	  
concerns	  would	  remain.	   	  First,	  two	  sets	  of	  researchers	  have	  developed	  simulations	  
of	   corporate	  MTRs	   employing	   differing	   starting	   points110	  and	   taking	   onto	   account	  
various	  factors,	  including	  not	  just	  NOLs	  but	  also	  the	  AMT,	  etc.,	  and	  the	  results	  vary	  –	  
not	  by	  a	   little	  –	  but	  by	  a	   lot.	   	  The	   following	   figure	  plots	  estimates	  of	  MTRs	   for	   the	  
Execucomp	  group	  of	  companies	  for	  2012	  derived	  from	  simulations	  designed	  by	  John	  
Graham	   (on	   the	   Y	   axis)	   against	   estimates	   derived	   by	   simulations	   of	   Professors	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  Supra	  Parts	  III.D.2&3.	  
107	  Supra	  Part	  III.D.4.	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  See,	  e.g.,	   Austin	   et	   al,	   supra	   note	  85	   (investigating	   the	   role	   of	   taxes	   in	   selecting	  
between	   ISOs	  and	  NQSOs	  and	  using	  Shevlin’s	  procedure	   to	  estimate	   firm	  MTRs	  at	  
the	  time	  of	  estimated	  option	  exercise).	  
109 	  The	   Compustat	   Execucomp	   database	   provides	   the	   ages	   of	   the	   “top	   five”	  
executives	   of	   S&P	   1500	   companies.	   	   For	   this	   population,	   estimating	   years	   until	  
retirement	  would	  be	   feasible	  and	  would	  seem	  to	  provide	  a	  reasonable	  estimate	  of	  
deferral	  period.	  
110 	  Professor	   John	   Graham	   provides	   simulated	   MTRs	   on	   his	   website:	  
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/.	  	  His	  estimation	  approach	  is	  described	  in	  
John	   R.	   Graham,	   Debt	   and	   the	   Marginal	   Tax	   Rate,	   J.	   FIN.	   ECON.	   41	   (1996).	   	   MTRs	  
derived	   through	   simulations	   by	   Professors	   Jennifer	   Blouin,	   John	   Core,	   and	  Wayne	  
Guay	  are	  available	  in	  Compustat.	  	  The	  Blouin,	  Core,	  and	  Guay	  approach	  is	  described	  
in	  Jennifer	  Blouin	  et	  al.,	  Have	  the	  Tax	  Benefits	  of	  Debt	  Been	  Overestimated?,	  98	  J.	  FIN.	  
ECON.	   195	   (2010).	   	   Graham’s	   simulation	   begins	   with	   Compustat	   reported	   NOLs,	  
while	   the	   Blouin,	   Core	   and	   Guay	   simulation	   starts	   with	   historical	   estimates	   of	  
taxable	  income.	  	  See	  Heitzman	  &	  Lester,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  9.	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Jennifer	   Blouin,	   John	   Core,	   and	   Wayne	   Guay	   (on	   the	   X	   axis).	   	   The	   correlation	  
coefficient	   is	  only	  0.28,	  but	  visual	   inspection	  alone	  suggests	  that	   these	  estimations	  





	   A	  second	  concern	  is	  that	  the	  data	  that	  is	  used	  to	  drive	  these	  simulations	  may	  
not	  be	   very	   good.	   	   It	   has	   long	  been	  understood	   that	  Compustat’s	  NOL	  data	   is	   less	  
than	  perfect,	  but	  in	  a	  recent	  paper,	  Professors	  Shane	  Heitzman	  and	  Rebecca	  Lester	  
report	  that	  Compustat’s	  NOL	  data	  failed	  to	  pick	  up	  one-­‐quarter	  of	  firms	  with	  NOLs	  
identified	   through	   hand-­‐collection	   of	   financial	   statement	   data.	   	   Using	   their	   hand-­‐
collected	   data,	   they	   found	   that	   NOL	   benefits	   were	   positively,	   and	   statistically	  
significantly,	  associated	  with	  the	  marginal	  use	  of	  equity	  funding.112	  	  All	  of	  which	  at	  
least	  raises	  the	  question	  whether	  poor	  MTR	  proxies	  or	  estimates	  have	  stymied	  the	  
search	   for	   evidence	   that	   employer	   MTRs	   affect	   deferred	   compensation	  
arrangements.	  	  
	  
	   Third,	  and	  finally,	  what	  are	  we	  to	  make	  of	  the	  survey	  evidence	  provided	  by	  
John	  Graham	  and	  his	  colleagues	  in	  which	  only	  10.6%	  of	  tax	  managers	  reported	  that	  
their	   firms	  used	  MTRs	   in	  making	  compensation	  decisions,	  versus	  almost	  45%	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Author’s	   calculation.	   	   Note	   that	   these	   estimated	   MTRs	   represent	   MTRs	   after	  
deductions	  for	   interest,	  which	  are	  generally	  thought	  to	  be	  the	  appropriate	  rates	  to	  
use	   for	   incremental	   decisions	   regarding,	   e.g.,	   the	   structure	   of	   executive	   pay	  
packages.	  Graham	  and	  Blouin,	  Core,	  and	  Guay	  also	  simulate	  pre-­‐interest	  deduction	  
MTRs.	   	   The	   correlation	   between	   the	   two	   for	   the	   2012	   Execucomp	   population	   of	  
firms	  is	  somewhat	  better	  at	  0.58.	  	  Author’s	  calculation.	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  Heitzman	  &	  Lester,	  supra	  note	  2.	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reported	  using	   either	  U.S.	   or	   jurisdiction-­‐specific	   STRs?113	  	  Does	   this	   data	   confirm	  
the	  notion	   that	   the	   complexity,	   non-­‐monotonicity,	   and,	   in	   some	   situations,	   limited	  
impact	  of	  NOLS	  on	  equity	  and	  deferred	  compensation	  discourage	   firms	   from	  even	  
making	  the	  effort	  to	  incorporate	  NOLs	  into	  their	  compensation	  decision-­‐making	  and	  
suggest	   that	   looking	   for	   relationships	   between	   MTRs	   and	   the	   use	   of	   equity	   and	  
deferred	  compensation	  is	  futile?	  	  Perhaps,	  but	  this	  is	  survey	  data,	  and	  one	  can	  never	  
be	   sure	   how	   respondents	   interpreted	   the	   questions.	   	   As	   the	   authors’	   note,	  
respondents	   at	   firms	   that	   base	   decisions	   on	   the	   STR	   but	   take	   into	   account	   NOLs	  
might	   have	   selected	   the	   STR	   option	   in	   responding	   to	   the	   survey.114	  	   However,	   for	  
those	   anticipating	   highly	   rational,	   firm-­‐specific	   cost/benefit	   based	   compensation	  
decisions,	  this	  data	  must	  be	  discouraging.	  
	  
V.	  Longitudinal	  Effects	  
	  
Thus	   far	   this	   article	   has	   focused	   on	   cross-­‐sectional	   variations	   in	   employer	  
MTRs	  and	  deferred	  compensation.	  	  But	  statutory	  tax	  rates	  change	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  
as	   the	   U.S.	   has	   recently	   experienced	   in	   unprecedented	   fashion.	   	   By	   cutting	   the	  
corporate	  tax	  rate	  to	  21%	  while	  leaving	  individual	  rates	  essentially	  unchanged,	  the	  
TCJA	   increased	   the	   attractiveness	   of	   equity	   and	   other	   deferred	   compensation,	   at	  
least	  for	  some	  companies	  and	  employees.	   	  It	  did	  so	  by	  boosting	  employer	  after-­‐tax	  
returns	  on	  some	  deferred	  funds	  relative	  to	  the	  after-­‐tax	  returns	  that	  employees	  can	  
achieve	  on	  their	  own.	   	  All	  else	  equal,	   the	  rate	  cut	  should	  result	   in	   increased	  use	  of	  
deferred	  compensation	  and	  increased	  periods	  of	  deferral.	  	  Is	  this	  likely	  to	  happen?	  	  	  
	  
There	   is	   some	   evidence	   that	   tax	   rate	   changes	   have	   led	   to	   differences	   in	  
deferred	   compensation	  use	   over	   time	   –	   longitudinal	   differences	   –	   as	   compared	   to	  
the	   cross-­‐sectional	   differences	   that	   researchers	   have	   focused	   on	   in	   the	   studies	  
discussed	  above.	  	  For	  example,	  Professors	  Hite	  and	  Long	  found	  evidence	  of	  a	  switch	  
in	   emphasis	   from	   tax-­‐qualified	   to	   non-­‐tax-­‐qualified	   options	   in	   the	   wake	   of	  
reductions	   in	   individual	   tax	   rates	   in	  1969	   that	   caused	  non-­‐qualified	  options	   to	  be	  
relatively	  more	  attractive.115	  	  And	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  companies	  would	  
be	  more	   likely	   to	   respond	   to	   secular	   changes	   in	   statutory	   tax	   rates	   than	   to	   firm-­‐
specific	   variations.	   	   For	   one	   thing,	   almost	   half	   of	   tax	  managers	   report	   relying	   on	  
STRs	   in	   making	   compensation	   decisions.116	  	   For	   another,	   companies	   appear	   to	  
exhibit	   herd	   behavior	   in	   designing	   compensation	   policies.	   	   If	   some	   firms	  were	   to	  
return	   to	   longer	  duration	  stock	  options	   in	   lieu	  of	   shorter	   term	  performance	  share	  
plans,	   for	   instance,	   it	   is	  conceivable	   that	  other	  would	   follow	  and	  a	   trend	  would	  be	  
set.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  Graham	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  6.	  
114	  Id.	  
115	  Gailen	  L.	  Hite	  &	  Michael	   S.	   Long,	  Taxes	  and	  Executive	  Stock	  Options,	   4	   J.	  ACCT.	  &	  
ECON.	  3	  (1982).	  
116	  Graham	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  6.	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But	   there	   are	   also	   reasons	   for	   skepticism.	   	   The	   reduction	   in	   the	   corporate	  
rate,	   if	   lasting,	   impacts	   only	   rates	   of	   return.	   	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   NOLs,	   there	   is	   no	  
deduction	   deferral	   effect	   if	   the	   new	   corporate	   rate	   remains	   consistent	   going	  
forward.	   	  Interest	  rates	  are	  low	  to	  begin	  with,	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  the	  rate	  cuts	  will	  
not	   affect	   employer	   after-­‐tax	   returns	   on	   deferred	   sums	   because	   employers	   have	  
hedged	   equity	   grants	   or	   have	   purchased	   COLI	   products	   to	   manage	   nonqualified	  
deferred	  compensation	  balances.117	  	  To	  be	   sure,	   if	   companies	  predict	   that	   the	   rate	  
cut	  will	  be	  short	   lived	  and	   that	   corporate	   rates	  are	   likely	   to	   increase	  substantially	  
prior	   to	   a	   deferred	   compensation	   payout,	   the	   deduction	   deferral	   effect	   would	  
improve	   the	   expected	   payoffs	   from	   deferred	   compensation.	   	   It	   is,	   as	   they	   say,	   an	  
empirical	  question.	  
	  
VI.	  	  Conclusion	  
	  
	   In	   this	   article,	   I	   have	   attempted	   to	   advance	  understanding	  of	   the	   impact	   of	  
employer	  NOLs	  and	  MTRs	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  deferred	  compensation	  by	  bifurcating	  
and	  unpacking	  two	  effects	  that	  I’ve	  termed	  the	  deduction	  deferral	  effect	  and	  the	  rate	  
of	  return	  effect.	   	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  these	  two	  effects	  may	  work	  in	  tandem	  to	  boost	  
the	   attractiveness	   of	   deferred	   compensation	  when	   an	   employer	   is	   in	   a	   large	  NOL	  
position,	  but	  they	  may	  not.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  employers	  deploy	  deferred	  funds	  in	  such	  
a	  way	  that	  after-­‐tax	  rates	  of	  return	  are	  unaffected	  by	  NOLs.	  	  For	  multinationals,	  the	  
taxation	   of	   the	   two	   effects	  may	   even	   occur	   in	   different	   jurisdictions.	   	   I	   have	   also	  
shown	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	   NOL	   duration	   and	   the	   relative	   value	   of	  
employer	  deductions	  at	  payout	  and	  grant	  –	   the	  deduction	  deferral	  effect	   –	   is	  non-­‐
monotonic,	   with	   the	   benefit	   peaking	   when	   the	   period	   of	   deferral	   matches	   NOL	  
duration	  and	  quickly	  declining	  thereafter.	  
	  
	   In	   sum,	   the	   relationship	   between	   employer	  NOLs	   and	   the	   attractiveness	   of	  
deferred	  compensation	  is	  complex	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  the	  payoffs	  may	  be	  limited	  or	  
non-­‐existent.	   	   Turning	   to	   the	   empirical	   literature,	   which	   is	   only	   sampled	   in	   this	  
article,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  that	  cross-­‐sectional	  variation	  in	  the	  use	  of	  equity	  and	  
non-­‐equity	   deferred	   compensation	   is	   driven	   by	   employer	   NOLs.	   	   Moreover,	   four	  
times	  as	  many	  tax	  managers	  report	  using	  STRs	   in	  their	  decision	  making	  regarding	  
compensation	  as	  report	  using	  MTRs.118	  	  Employing	  an	  STR	  heuristic	  and	  essentially	  
ignoring	  NOLs	  in	  compensation	  decision-­‐making	  could	  be	  a	  rational	  response	  given	  
the	  complexity	  and,	  at	  times,	  limited	  payoffs	  that	  have	  been	  described.	  
	  
	   Or,	   perhaps,	   researchers	   are	   failing	   to	   find	   statistically	   significant	  
relationships	   between	   employer	   tax	   status	   and	   the	   use	   of	   deferred	   compensation	  
because	   of	   the	   weakness	   or	   misuse	   of	   NOL	   proxies	   or	   MTR	   estimations.	   	   NOL	  
dummy	  variable	  proxies	   are	  unlikely	   to	  be	  up	   to	   this	   complex	   task	   and	   simulated	  
MTR	  estimations	  suffer	  from	  poor	  input	  data.	  	  The	  latter	  problem	  can	  likely	  be	  fixed,	  
but	   researchers	   also	  need	   to	  understand	   the	   importance	  of	   including	   estimates	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  See	  supra	  Part	  III.D.	  
118	  Graham	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  6.	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employer	   MTRs	   at	   payout	   as	   well	   as	   at	   grant	   in	   their	   analyses	   in	   order	   to	   fully	  
capture	  the	  economics	  of	  deferred	  compensation.	  
	  
As	   a	   final	   point,	   I	   should	   emphasize	   that	  while	   I	   have	   focused	   on	   deferred	  
compensation	   in	   this	   article,	   the	   analysis	   is	   generalizable	   to	   counterparty	  deferral	  
more	   broadly.	   	   Outside	   of	   the	   deferred	   compensation	   universe,	   it	   may	   be	   more	  
common	   to	   find	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   deferral	   party	   (the	   analog	   to	   the	   employee	  
deferring	   compensation)	   is	   in	   an	  NOL	  position,	   in	  which	   case	  deferral	  party	  NOLs	  
would	  make	  deferral	  less	  attractive,	  not	  more	  attractive,	  and	  the	  deduction	  deferral	  
effect	  and	  rate	  of	  return	  effect	  could	  be	   in	  tension	  rather	  than	  working	   in	  tandem.	  	  
Almost	  certainly,	  context-­‐specific	  factors	  will	  impact	  the	  deduction	  deferral	  and/or	  
rate	  of	  return	  effects,	  much	  as	  employer	  hedging	  can	  negate	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  effect	  
















Deduction	  Deferral	  Effect	  
	  
Approach	   is	   to	   hold	   employer	   (ER)	  whole	   after	   tax	   and	  measure	   improvement	   in	  
employee’s	   (EE)	   after-­‐tax	   position.	   	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   NOLs,	   ER	   is	   indifferent	  
between	  paying	  current	  compensation	  of	  1	  and	  setting	  aside	  deferred	  compensation	  
of	  (1	  –	  STR),	  where	  STR	  is	  the	  ER’s	  statutory	  tax	  rate.	  	  Between	  the	  points	  of	  deferral	  
and	   payout	   after	   d	   years,	   deferred	   funds	   grow	   by	   (1	   +	   i(1	   –	   STR))d.	   	   At	   deferred	  
compensation	  payout,	  ER	  deducts	  the	  payment	  that	   it	  can	  then	  gross	  up	  by	  1/(1	  –	  
STR)	  and	  EE	  pays	  tax	  at	  her	  ordinary	  income	  rate,	  leaving	  EE	  after	  tax:	  
	  
(1)	   [(1	  –	  STR)	  *	  (1	  +	  i(1	  –	  STR))d	  /	  (1	  –	  STR)]	  *	  (1	  –	  tEE)	  
	  
Assuming	   that	   ER	  NOLs	  have	  no	   affect	   on	   investment	   rates	   of	   return,	   introducing	  
NOLs	  results	  in	  the	  following	  modifications	  to	  (1):	  
	  
(2)	   [(1	  –	  STR	  *	  DFC)	  *	  (1	  +	  i(1	  –	  STR))d	  /	  (1	  –	  STR	  *	  DFD)]	  *	  (1	  –	  tEE)	  
	  
where,	   for	   any	   given	   NOL	   duration,	   DFC	   is	   the	   discount	   factor	   for	   the	   number	   of	  
years	  until	  a	  current	  deduction	  would	  first	  be	  useful	  and	  DFD	  is	  the	  discount	  factor	  
for	   the	   number	   of	   years	   until	   a	   deferred	   deduction	   would	   first	   be	   useful.	   	   For	  
example,	  for	  10	  year	  deferral	  and	  a	  5	  year	  expected	  NOL	  period,	  DFC	  would	  be	  the	  
appropriate	  discount	  factor	  for	  5	  years	  and	  DFD	  would	  be	  1;	  for	  10	  year	  deferral	  and	  
a	  15	  year	  expected	  NOL	  period,	  DFC	  would	  be	  the	  appropriate	  discount	  factor	  for	  15	  
years	  and	  DFD	  would	  be	  the	  appropriate	  factor	  for	  5	  years.	  
	  
The	  impact	  of	  NOLs	  on	  the	  joint	  economics	  of	  deferred	  compensation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  deduction	  deferral	  effect	  is	  ((2)	  -­‐	  (1))/(1),	  which	  simplifies	  to	  
	  
	   (3)	   [(1	  -­‐	  STR	  *	  DFC)/(1	  –	  STR	  *	  DFD)]	  –	  1.	  
	  
	  
Example:	  STR	  =	  tEE	  =	   .3;	   i	  =	  0.1;	  d	  =	  10	  years.	  After	  10	  years,	  EE	  receives	  after	   tax	  
deferred	  compensation	  times:	  
	  
Baseline	  (no	  NOLS):	  [(1-­‐.3)*(1+.1(1-­‐.3))10/(1-­‐.3)]*(1-­‐.3)	  =	  1.377	  
5	  year	  NOL:	  [(1-­‐.3*.713)*(1+.1(1-­‐.3))10/(1-­‐.3)]*(1-­‐.3)	  =	  1.546	  (12.3%	  more)	  
15	  year	  NOL:	  [(1-­‐.3*.3624)*(1+.1(1-­‐.3))10/(1-­‐.3*.713)]*(1-­‐.3)	  =	  1.561	  (13.4%	  more)	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Rate	  of	  Return	  Effect	  
	  
Absent	  NOLs,	  deferred	  funds	  at	  payout	  (d)	  grow	  by:	  
	  
(4)	   (1	  +	  i(1	  –	  STR))d	  	  
	  
For	  NOL	  duration	  (n)	  <	  deferral	  period	  (d),	  value	  at	  end	  of	  deferral	  period	  is:	  
	  
(5)	   [((1+i)n)*(1+i(1-­‐STR))-­‐(((1+i)n)-­‐1)*STR]*(1+i*(1-­‐STR)d-­‐1-­‐n)	  
	  
For	  NOL	  duration	  (n)	  >	  or	  =	  deferral	  period	  (d),	  value	  at	  end	  of	  deferral	  period	  is:	  
	  
(6)	   (1+i)d-­‐((1+i)d-­‐1)*STR*DF	  	  
	  
where	  DF	  is	  the	  appropriate	  discount	  factor	  for	  n-­‐d+1	  years.	  
	  
The	  impact	  of	  NOLs	  on	  the	  joint	  economics	  of	  deferred	  compensation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  rate	  of	  return	  effect	  is	  ((5)	  or	  (6)	  -­‐	  (4))/(4).	  
	  
	  
Example:	   STR	  =	   tEE	   =	   .3;	   i	   =	   0.1;	   d	   =	   10	   years.	   After	   10	   years,	   deferred	   amount	   is	  
increased	  after	  tax	  by:	  
	  
Baseline	  (no	  NOLS):	  (1+.1(1-­‐.3))10	  =	  1.967	  
5	   year	   NOL:	   [((1+.1)5)*(1+.1(1-­‐.3))-­‐(((1+.1)5)-­‐1)*.3]*(1+.1*(1-­‐.3)4)	   =	   2.019	   (2.6%	  
more)	  










This	  is	  essentially	  the	  same	  as	  the	  deduction	  deferral	  analysis,	  but	  now	  we	  include	  
NOL	   impacts	   on	   ER	   after-­‐tax	   rate	   of	   return.	   	   Approach	   is	   to	   hold	   ER	   whole	   and	  
measure	  improvement	  in	  EE	  position	  at	  end	  of	  deferral	  period	  (d).	  	  	  
	  
Absent	  NOLs,	  EE	  has	  at	  d:	  
	  
(7)	   [(1	  –	  STR)	  *	  (1	  +	  i(1	  –	  STR))d	  /	  (1	  –	  STR)]	  *	  (1	  –	  tEE).	  
	  
With	  NOLs,	  NQDC	  provides	  EE:	  
	  
(8)	   [(1	  –	  STR	  *	  DFC)	  *	  (1	  +	  i’*(1	  –	  STR))d	  /	  (1	  –	  STR	  *	  DFD)]	  *	  (1	  –	  tEE).	  
	  
The	  2nd	  term	  (1	  +	   i’*(1	  –	  STR))d]	   is	  the	  growth	  in	  set	  aside	  funds	  over	  the	  deferral	  
period	   as	   increased	   by	   ER	  NOLs	   for	   various	   periods:	   call	   it	   Z.	   	   As	   before,	   for	   any	  
given	  NOL	  duration	   (n),	  DFC	  is	   the	  discount	   factor	   for	   the	  number	  of	   years	  until	   a	  
current	   deduction	   would	   first	   be	   useful	   and	   DFD	   is	   the	   discount	   factor	   for	   the	  
number	  of	  years	  until	  a	  deferred	  deduction	  would	  first	  be	  useful.	  
	  
The	  impact	  of	  NOLs	  on	  the	  joint	  economics	  of	  deferred	  compensation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  deduction	  deferral	  effect	  is	  ((8)	  -­‐	  (7))/(7),	  which	  simplifies	  to:	  
	  




Example:	  STR	  =	  tEE	  =	   .3;	   i	  =	  0.1;	  d	  =	  10	  years.	  After	  10	  years,	  EE	  receives	  after	   tax	  
deferred	  compensation	  times:	  
	  
Baseline	  (no	  NOLS):	  [(1-­‐.3)*(1+.1(1-­‐.3))10/(1-­‐.3)]*(1-­‐.3)	  =	  1.377	  
5	  year	  NOL:	  [(1-­‐.3*.713)*2.019/(1-­‐.3)]*(1-­‐.3)	  =	  1.587	  (15.3%	  more)	  
15	  year	  NOL:	  [(1-­‐.3*.3624)*2.275/(1-­‐.3*.713)]*(1-­‐.3)	  =	  1.806	  (31.1%	  more)	  
	  
	  
